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Summary;
Dividend policies of non-life insurance companies are theoretically
and empirically investigated. Data for 61 companies during 1955-75
are used to determine the dividend payment behavior for non-life
insurance companies. In addition, the impact of dividend policy on
the value of a firm is empirically tested; the cost of capital for the
non-life insurance industry is also estimated in accordance with
three alternative methods.
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DIVIDEND POLICIES OF NON-LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANIES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
The dividend policy of the firm is important for several reasons.
An understanding of the factors influencing dividend payments contributes
to the theory of corporate savings. Dividends may also influence the price
per share of common stock, thus dividend behavior is of interest because
it affects the maximization of shareholder wealth. The value of equity
shares In turn Influences the cost of capital of the firm. Thus, dividend
policy also plays a direct role in the firm's financing and investment
decision.
While the factors influencing the dividend policies of industrial
firms have been studied in some detail by Lintner [17], Brittain [3],
Fama and Babiak [7], Dhrymes and Rurz [5], Fama [6], and others, theories
of dividend behavior have not been as extensively developed and explored
for financial firms. The purpose of this research is to study the
dividend policies of one type of financial intermediary, non-life Insur-
ance companies, in light of some widely accepted behavioral theories. If
the dividend practices of these firms depart from those anticipated by
these theories, this is of interest to the understanding of finance. On
the other hand, dividend payment patterns which follow the theoretical
anticipations will tend to strengthen them. •
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in6urance companies is discussed. Three methods are used to estimate
the cost of capital. The Jensen investment performance measure is used
to investigate the performance of non-life insurance companies' common
stock over time. The final section of the paper summarizes the implica-
tions of the empirical results for financial theory as it relates to the
non-life insurance industry.
The insurers were selected at random from the population of firms
in Best's Property Liability (formerly Best's Fire and Casualty ) Insurance
Reports having a complete series of 1955-75 financial data. The stock
price data were taken from the Bank Quotation Record .
II. THE DIVIDEND YIELD AND EARNINGS PAYOUT RATIO
Information regarding the dividend yields and the earnings payout
ratios for non-life insurers is of interest to both investors and finan-
cial managers. Gordon [12] and Lintner [19] derived a stock valuation
model as
p-r^r en
where, P = price per share of common stock
g = br, the growth rate of dividend payment
b = earnings retention rate 1 - earnings payout ratio
r internal rate of return
k investor's required rate of return
d = dividend per share for current period
Equation (1) implies that a company's market price per share is
generally determined by its dividend per share, required rate of return,
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earnings payout ratio, and internal rate of return. In addition, it
is also well known that a firm's internal rate of return is determined
by its profitability.
Theoretically, the magnitude of the earnings payout ratio for a
firm is jointly determined by its investment opportunities and its share-
holders' preferences. This decision is complicated in the situation of
a non-life insurer by the payment of policyholder dividends. Decisions
regarding the level of such dividends may be independent of the insurer's
shareholder preferences or its need for retained earnings, being based
rather upon either retrospective rating formulas or the need to reduce
premiums for competitive purposes. It should also be noted that the
policyholder's dividend is a tax deductible item.
If a firm has an investment opportunity with a return exceeding
its cost of capital, and the internal sources of funds are cheaper than
the external sources, then a financial manager will generally reduce his
firm's earnings payout ratio.
In relation to external financing, stock non-life insurers are
limited to the following alternatives: (1) mergers and acquisitions
involving other insurance companies, (2) new stock issues, (3) contribu-
tions from a parent insurer or holding company, and/or (4) borrowing
of funds for general business purposes (the latter by Section 76, New
York Insurance Code, amendment effective September 1, 1969).
In the situation of a merger, one of the insurers loses its
identity and the surviving company absorbs all of its assets, liabilities,
and legal rights. The shareholders of the merged insurer usually retain
a financial interest in the new, firm consistent with their interest in
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the acquired firm. The acquisition may involve either the use of cash
or a tax-free exchange of shares.
A stock non-life insurer can also acquire a subsidiary insurer by
gaining ownership of more than 50 percent of its voting stock using either
cash or an exchange of securities. As a practical matter, Forbes [8]
found that non-life insurers usually use exchanges of stock in acquiring
subsidiaries because of the attractiveness of this approach from tax and
liquidity standpoints. Forbes also found that new stock issues are a
relatively unimportant form of non-life insurance external financing,
comprising slightly more than 5 percent of the total financing volume
during the 1955-66 period studied [8],
The advantages of external financing involving contributions from
a parent insurer or holding company are its simplicity and the lack of
substantial transactions costs. The borrowing of funds for general
business purposes is a relatively new external financing option which
has not been explored at length in the financial literature except for
Nye [22].
Forbes found in another study [9] that new money flowing into the
non-life insurance industry played a minor role in the industry's capital
and surplus growth during 1956-70. Given this behavior, the conservation
of capital and surplus would appear to be a primary non-life insurance
company objective in the typical situation. Inasmuch as dividend policy
provides the only mechanism for controlling the level of retained earnings,
one would expect dividend policies of non-life insurance companies to be
geared to the insurer's capital and surplus requirements. Empirical re-
sults reported later in this study suggest a direct relationship between
dividend policies and capital and surplus adjustments in this industry.
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Haugen and Kroncke [14] have argued that policyholder funds also
represent a source of external financing to the non-life insurance
industry. Other things remaining equal, an increase in the rate of an
insurer's unearned premium and loss and loss adjustment expense reserves
to its capital and surplus will affect the risk/return relationships
involving its shareholders. However, this interesting problem is not
studied in this paper. Furthermore, the financial models in this study
can be applied successfully to an analysis of dividend behavior. without
giving explicit recognition to the role of policyholder funds as a
financing source. This is because the specifications of our models do
not require policyholder fund information.
The investor's preference for either a dividend or a capital gain
is also an important factor in determining the earnings payout ratio.
Conceptually, an investor's rate of return on common stock in period t
can be defined as:
p
t -
p
t-i .
d
t !2;r =—— + ^ (2)
C
*t-l t-1
where, r = rate of return on common stock
P market price per share in period t
P
,
market price per share in period t-1
d dividend per share in period t
Data associated with four different income measures and the divi-
dends for 61 firms (see Appendix A) during 1955-75 are used in order to
analyze the earnings payout behavior for the non-life insurance industry.
The four different methods of calculating the net income of a non-life
insurer involve the following:
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(A) earnings without the amortization of underwriting expenses
and without unrealized capital gains and losses
(B) earnings without the amortization of underwriting expenses
and with unrealized capital gains and losses
(C) earnings involving the amortization of underwriting ex-
penses without unrealized capital gains and losses
(D) earnings involving the amortization of underwriting ex-
penses with unrealized capital gains and losses
Under the accounting procedures used to measure (A) and (B), the
first year acquisition costs for insurance policies are written off
immediately against earnings without proper allocation to the periods
in which the associated premiums are earned. This accounting method is
required by the Convention Annual Statement, a uniform accounting docu-
ment filed annually by all United States non-life insurers at the
insurance departments of the states in which they do business. It is
also the method of accounting used in federal income tax calculations.
In the situation of an insurer with an expanding premium volume,
this accounting technique usually understates profits (overstates losses)
and understates capital and surplus. This is viewed by regulators as
desirable because the resulting excess valuation in the unearned premium
reserve (UPR) provides additional surplus if the insurer encounters
financial difficulty (there will be no excess valuation of course if
all of the UPR is required for the payment of losses and loss adjustment
expenses). The lack of underwriting expense amortization under statutory
accounting also tends to make insurers more cautious in obtaining new
business 6ince there are large surplus reductions if premium expansion
is too rapid. This is thought to limit an insurer's potential for run-
away growth resulting in careless underwriting.
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Income measures (C) and (D) involve the proper amortization of
underwriting expenses. This is accomplished by adding to earnings the
after-tax prepaid expense involving the increase in the unearned premium
for the period. The increase in the UPR is multiplied by (1-t)E , where
t is the marginal federal income tax rate for the year and E equals the
ratio of underwriting expenses to net written premiums.
The other adjustment in the paper involves the inclusion of un-
realized capital gains and losses in income measures (B) and (D) . This
"flow-through" approach to measuring earnings eliminates the potential
for earnings manipulation through the selective taking of realized capital
gains or losses (usually involving the taking of realized capital gains
in order to improve poor results) . The primary argument against including
unrealized capital gains and losses in earnings is the "realization
principle". Under this principle, it is argued that only realized income
and loss items should be included in the income statement [1].
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has not
taken a clear position on the treatment of unrealized capital gains and
losses in insurance company earnings. Most insurers take such a gain or
loss as a direct credit or charge, respectively, to surplus rather than
a "flow-through" to earnings. The "flow-through" approach to earnings
measurement does not give an insurer an incentive to take realized capi-
tal gains in order to disguise bad performance. The full accounting for
capital gains and losses in earnings also better describes the change in
the surplus position of the insurer which is relevant to the earnings
payout decision. Thus, on an a priori basis, one would expect earnings
measures (B) and (D) to be more closely associated with dividend decisions
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than measures (A) and (C), other things remaining equal. Empirical
results reported later in the study substantiate this finding.
As a negative net income for an individual insurer in a particular
year is not unusual, a time aggregate earnings payout ratio is calculated
for each firm over the 21 year period. The resulting 61 payout ratios
for the 21 years are listed in Tables la and lb.
During 1955-75, the ownership arrangement for these insurers can be
classified as (J.) majority of common stock, never held by a single entity
during the period, (ii) majority of common stock acquired by a single
entity sometime during the period, and (iii) majority of common stock
held by a single entity throughout the period (see Appendix A). One
would expect th£.t the earnings payout policies of insurers having widely
held common stock under ownership arrangement (i) would most closely
follow the models found successful in describing dividend behavior in
other industries. This is because the shareholders of these insurers
have the same objectives as other investors in widely held equities. On
the other hand, the dividend policies of wholly owned subsidiaries under
ownership arrangement (iii) would be determined by the managerial dis-
cretions of the parent insurers or holding companies. Dividends may be
declared in theste situations in order to reduce perceived excess surpluses
in the subsidiaries. Sometimes subsidiaries are acquired or holding com-
panies are fornuid for the express purpose of transferring surplus from
relatively unprofitable insurance operations to other activities. The
dividend policies of the insurers in group (ii) would be expected to vary
depending upon the individual circumstances surrounding each acquisition.
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The analysis of variance technique is used in order to test whether
significant differences arise among the earnings payout ratios for these
three groups.
From Table lc it is found that the average earnings payout ratios
are significantly different among the three groups if the (A) or the (B)
net income definition is used. However, the average earnings payout
ratios are not significantly different among the three groups if the (C)
or (D) net income definition is used. This implies that there is a sig-
nificant difference in the earnings payout depending upon whether statu-
tory or underwriting expense amortization accounting procedures are used,
but that the presence or absence of unrealized capital gains and losses
in earnings does not greatly influence the dividend decision. Apparently
insurance company managements view unrealized capital gains and losses
as a transitory rather than permanent component of earnings for dividend
decision purposes. Furthermore when either the (A) or (B) income defini-
tion is used, the average earnings payout ratio is higher than 50 percent.
This figure is close to the earnings payout ratio of the electric utility
industry as indicated in Lee [16]. This implies that the non-life
insurance industry is concerned with maintaining a high earnings payout
ratio. This may also imply that the dividend policy of the non-life
insurance industry does affect its stock prices. Empirical studies re-
lated to this issue will be explored in section IV. Possible implications
of a high earnings payout ratio on the cost of equity capital will be
discussed in section VI.
As only a portion of the firms listed in Appendix A had actively
traded common stock during 1955-75, the dividend yield results are based
-12-
upon a subset of these insurers (see Appendix B) . The annual average
shareholder dividend yields calculated for these insurers are listed in
Table 2. The analysis of variance technique is used to test whether the
dividend yield for the non-life insurance companies changed over the 25
year period studied.
It is found from Table 2 that the shareholder dividend yields among
the years are significantly different at a one percent level of significance.
The average dividend yield for the 21 years studied is 3.38 percent. It
should also be noted that the dividend yield fluctuates over time. This
fluctuation Is related to business cycles and economic conditions. The
average dividend yields for 1974 and 1975 are 5.57% and 6.03% respectively.
These figures are as high as the time deposit interest rates in these
respective years. This information also indicates that non-life insurance
companies' stock dividend yields are similar to those found for utility
companies. The relationship between the dividend yield and the cost of
capital will be explored in section VT.
The results of this section give both investors and decision makers
some cross-sectional and time series information about the earnings pay-
out ratios and dividend yields of non-life insurers.
III. DIVIDEND FORECASTING MODEL FOR THE
NON-LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Lintner [17] has used the partial adjustment assumption in order to
derive a dividend forecasting model for an industrial firm. This model
takes the following form:
AD
t
- y(D
t
*
- D
t_1 )
(3)
where,
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D
t
*
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t
(4)
and,
D " actual total cash dividend payment in period t
D = desired total cash dividend payment in period t
D - = actual total dividend payment in period t-1
E = total earnings in period t
Y = partial adjustment coefficient
B = target earnings payout ratio
After substituting (4) into (3), we can formulate the following al-
ternative time series regression models in order to describe an individual
firm's dividend behavior over time:
D
t
= A
o
+ A
l
E
t
+ A
2
D
t-i
+ £
lt <5 >
D
t
« BlEt + B^ + e2t (6)
where,
A. » B. «* By and
A2 = B
2
= 1-y;
A is the intercept; and both e.. and e„ are disturbance terms for
the regressions. To accommodate the two special circumstances we have
encountered in this study (full and partial dividend freezes and capital
and surplus capacity considerations) , equation (5) Is modified as
CS
D
t "
a
o
+ a
l
X
t
+ a
2
E
t
+ a
3
D
t-l
+ a
4 Ai; + £ t C7)
where,
f - for 1955-70
X
t \
/ - 1 for 1971-75
as dummy variables
-14-
and, CS
t capacity ratio
AA
fc
where,
CS = capital and surplus at the end of the period
AA = admitted assets at the end of the period
t
The change in a non-life insurer's capital and surplus is explained
by the following:
ACS=I+U-D+F+M
where,
I net income or loss after taxes [the sum of the statutory
underwriting gain (loss), net realized capital gain (loss),
interest, dividends, and rents, reduced by net loss from
agents' premium balances charged off, and adjusted for the
federal and foreign income tax liability (rebate)
]
U = unrealized capital gain (loss)
D = dividends declared to shareholders and/or policyholders
F external financing
M = miscellaneous adjustments (the sum of the change in the
excess of bodily injury liability and compensation statu-
tory and voluntary reserve over the case basis and loss
expense reserve, change in nonadmitted assets, change in
liability for unauthorized reinsurance, change in foreign
exchange adjustment, and net remittances to or from the
home office)
.
In regard to the miscellaneous adjustments, the "excess of bodily
injury liability and compensation statutory and voluntary reserve over
the case basis and loss expense reserve" is required in the situation
when an insurer's reported unpaid claim liability is less than the
minimum reserve required by state statute. Nonadmitted assets having
questionable liquidity are also determined by statutory accounting.
They are not shown on the Insurer's balance sheet. If a reinsurer is
not licensed by the state (unauthorized) , the insurer must establish a
liability in order to cover the reinsurer's unearned premium and loss
and loss adjustment expense liabilities.
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From the above model, it can be seen that an insurer needs to
retain capital and surplus in order to absorb (1) net losses from
operations (defined by I), (2) unrealized capital losses, and (3) mis-
cellaneous adjustments (defined by M) . Generally, items (1) and (2)
will cause the greatest surplus fluctuations in a given accounting
period. Net losses from operations may be compounded by the upward
adjustment of inadequate loss and loss adjustment expense reserves
arising from claims incurred in prior years. These adjustments can
be especially large during periods of rapid inflation.
It is also evident from the model that the adjustment of dividends
is the most realistic alternative in attempting to conserve capital and
surplus in the typical situation. This is because the raising of exter-
nal financing through new equity issues involves a transactions cost,
uncertain proceeds (especially in volatile stock markets), and is time
consuming as well as troublesome to management. Empirical data indicate
that new equity issues have not been an important form of external
financing in the non-life insurance industry [8]. External financing
involving mergers and acquisitions is not motivated by the need to con-
serve surplus as it does not affect the CS /AA ratio in most situations.
Contributions of surplus from parent insurers or holding companies, or
the borrowing of funds, have not been common external financing practices.
Thus, dividend policy is the only decision variable left.
It is also relevant to note the CS /AA ratios fluctuate widely
from period to period for a given insurer because of the impact of un-
realized capital gains and losses involving common stock portfolios and
fluctuating underwriting results (see Forbes [10]). Thus a non-life
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insurer does not have time to consider external financing as a means of
stabilizing capital and surplus in the usual situation. The adjustment
of dividends is a more direct and immediate method of correcting capital
and surplus deficiencies. As an alternative hypothesis, it might be
argued that rapidly changing capital and surplus positions would make a
non-life insurer more cautious in its earnings payout policies. These
issues are explored by including the CS /AA ratio in equation (7).
In Table 3a, we have calculated the average capacity ratios for 78
insurers for each of the years studied. Observation of the Table will
indicate that the average capacity ratio for the non-life insurance
industry fluctuates over time. This fluctuation may result from changes
in the value of insurance company equity portfolios and/or variations in
underwriting results. In addition, the coefficients of variation asso-
ciated with the average capacity ratios in Table 3a suggest wide variations
in capacity ratios among the insurers for each year.
Table 3b presents a frequency distribution of the temporal coeffi-
cients of variation for the capacity ratios of the 78 insurers. It should
be noted that 73 percent of the coefficients in the Table fall within a
range of .1 to .3.'
Table 3c shows the percentage distribution of the average 1955-75
capacity ratios for the 78 insurers. Approximately 64 percent of the
insurers had average capacity ratios within the range of .3 to .5.
The empirical results based upon this specification for 61 non-life
insurers during 1955-75 are reported in Table 4. From the t-values asso-
ciated with the regression coefficients of the dummy variable (a ), it is
found that 15 out of 61 firms appeared to change their dividend payment
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behavior because of the dividend freeze. Similarly, from the t-values
associated with the regression coefficients of the capacity variable (a,),
only 17 of the 61 firms had an a, coefficient significantly different
from zero. This implies that most of the insurers' dividend decisions were
not affected by a change in the capacity variable. This may be due to the
fact that a change in retained earnings is only one of two alternatives
for adjusting the capacity ratio. In general, a non-life insurance company
can also issue new equity in order to raise its capacity ratio. It should
also be noted that four alternative earnings definitions are used to fit
equation (7). These empirical results are reported in Tables 4a through
4d. The overall results are relatively independent of the different income
definitions used.
One of the main purposes of equation (7) is to forecast a firm's
future dividend payment. It is well-known that the adjusted coefficient
_2
of determination (R ) provides an indication of a regression equation's
—2
forecasting power. Based upon Table 4a, it is found that the R ranges
from .0209 to .9845. A frequency distribution of R for these 61 firms
is listed in Table 5. It is found that more than 90 percent of these
firms' dividend behaviors can be described by equation (7). Furthermore,
_2
the R are classified according to the ownership arrangements (i), (ii),
and (iii) defined above. From the analysis of variance results indicated
—2
in Table 6 it is found that significant differences exist for the R among
these three groups. The implication arising from these results is that
the ownership arrangement has an impact upon the dividend payment behavior
of a non-life insurer. This follows the expectations discussed earlier
_2
in the paper. Other possible explanations for the low R include the
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presence of neg.ative earnings in some of the years studied for a parti-
cular insurer a:id policyowner dividends. It is well-known that the
dividend payments associated with the non-life insurance industry can be
classified into shareholder dividends and policy owner dividends. Policy-
owner dividends are tax deductible whereas shareholder dividends are not.
The percentages of policyowner dividends to total dividends are listed
in Table 7. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of equa-
tion (7) based upon shareholder dividends are combined with the SUR
results in Table 12a - 12c.
The estimated partial adjustment coefficient y and the percentage of
optimal dividend related to current earnings are of interest to both
investors and financial managers in the non-life insurance industry.
Based upon Table 4a, the average y is .53 and average $ is .268. These
imply that the partial adjustment coefficient is .53 and the average
target payout ratio is 26.8%. The estimated y «53 also Implies that
it takes non-life insurance firms an average of about 2 years to adjust
their dividend payments to desirable levels.
Fama and Babiak [7] have shown that Lintner's [17] model without the
constant term has the greatest forecasting power. Therefore, equation (7)
without a and a. is also calculated for the 61 firms. The results are
o 4
reported in Appendix C. From Appendix C and Table 4, it is found that the
—2
R associated with Lintner's model without the constant term are gen-
erally lower than with the constant term. This is due to the fact that the
capacity ratio is important for 17 firms. In the next section, two alterna-
tive methods will be proposed to test the effectiveness of dividend policy
on the value of non-life insurance company equity.
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IV. DIVIDEND POLICY AND EQUITY VALUE
The impact of dividend policy upon the value of equity is of inter-
est to the financial manager. In this section, two alternative financial
models will be used in order to analyze this relationship for the non-
life insurance industry.
The first model involves the following:
P_. = a + bD_ + cR . (8)
ti ti ti
where,
P = stock price per share for the i firm in period t
D
.
= dividends per share for the i firm in period t
R . = retained earnings per share for the i firm in period t
Gordon [12] has used the stock price valuation model indicated in (1)
in order to justify equation (8). Furthermore, he has discussed the
potential usefulness of the relative magnitudes of the estimated b and c
regression coefficients in (8) in testing the importance of dividends
relative to retained earnings in the determination of equity value.
Granger [13] has also used the dividend stream model and the dividend
forecasting model indicated in (6) in order to draw theoretical implica-
tions for equation (8). In addition Granger has shown that the relative
magnitude between the estimated b and c regression coefficients in (8)
is not an appropriate index for determining the importance of dividends
relative to retained earnings in determining equity value. Thus, we will
use only the t-values associated with both the estimated b's and estimated
c's in order to determine the relative importance of dividends and re-
tained earnings per share in determining the stock price.
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Cross-sectional data associated with P., D. and R. are used to esti-
mate the parameters of equation (8) . These results for the 21 years are
listed in Table 8. As some of the non-life insurers were acquired by
other firms, the sample size is not equal over time. The sample size for
each year is listed in the last column of Table 8. From the empirical
results in Table 8, it is found that the relative Importance of the divi-
dends and retained earnings per share in determining equity value varies
through time. This may be due to the fact that the investment opportunities
for non-life insurers and the investors' preferences for dividends rela-
tive to retained earnings changed over time. It is also of interest to
observe that the estimated c's for 1964, 1966, 1969, 1973, and 1975 are
significantly different from zero for one retained earnings definition
but not for the others. A more detailed interpretation of the empirical
results in Table 8 will be explored in section V.
Secondly, the model developed by Bar-Yosef and Koldony [2] as de-
fined in equation (9) below will be used to analyze non-life insurance
company dividend policy.
5i
r
i
= a
o
+ a
l
gi
+ a
2 (E^ + £ i (9)
where,
r. = average monthly rate of return for the i firm
for 21 years
3i
= the beta coefficient for the ± t firm estimated from
the capital asset pricing model using monthly data
5i(—) = the time aggregated annual earnings payout ratio
i for 21 years.
It is well-known that the capital asset pricing model [CAPM] to be
used to estimate B. was developed by Sharpe [23], Lintner [20], and Mossin
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[21]. The t-values associated with the a„ regression coefficient will
be used to determine whether dividend policy affects the value of non-life
insurance equity.
To estimate the empirical relationships in equation (9) , monthly
stock prices associated with the 34 firms were collected from New York
Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and over the counter trading
records. These data were adjusted for stock splits when the rates of
return were calculated.
As the first stage, the betas for equation (9) were estimated by
using the CAPM as indicated by equation (10)
:
r
Jt "
r
ft
= a
i
+ B
j
(R
mt " V + £jt (10)
where,
r. = rate of return of ith firm's common stock in
i tJ period t
r f
= risk free rate of return using monthly Treasury
bill rates as a proxy
R ^ = market rate of return using Standard and Poor's
mt
• jindex.
The beta coefficients associated with these 34 firms are listed in
Table 9.
The results for equation (9) are shown in Table 10 for the four
income measures. The t-values associated with the a„ coefficients
provide an indication of the significance of dividend policy in deter-
mining the average monthly rates of return for the period. It can be
seen from Table 10 that dividend policy was important in determining
stock price behavior when using income measures B and D. These results
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are of interest because income measures B and D include unrealized
capital gains and losses whereas income measures A and C do not include
these gains and losses. Foster [11] has argued that the stock market
considers unrealized capital gains and losses in pricing non-life
insurance equity shares. He used a carefully specified econometric
valuation model in arriving at this conclusion. If one accepts this,
then dividend policies are relevant in determining non-life insurance
company equity values.
V. SUR AND AGGREGATE BEHAVIOR FOR SHAREHOLDER DIVIDENDS
In the fir.al section of the paper, a pooled time series and cross
sectional simultaneous equation model will be constructed using the
following extensions of equations (8) and (5), above:
p
ti "
a
i
+ Va + c iRti
P
t2
=
'
a
2
+ b
2
D
t2
+ C
2
R
t2
(11)
and
P =< a + b D +CR
tn n n tn n tn
D
ti -
A
l
+ VEti> + W-Dl 5
D
t2
: ' A
2
+ B
2
(E
t2
) + C
2
(D(t-l)2 ) (12)
D - A + B (E
fc ) + C (D, , . )tn n n tn n (t-l)n
where the equations are generated for each year and the subscripts l...n
refer to each of the insurers studied.
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Zellner's [24] seemingly unrelated regression method is now used
to simultaneously estimate these equation systems. The strength of this
method rests in its ability to consider the effects of both time and firm
behavior upon dividend policy.
The SUR technique attempts to take into account the lead and lag
effect of common stock price determination. Because of the limited number
of observations in each year, we separated the 21 years into groups of 10
and 11 years, respectively. A residual correlation coefficient matrix
was calculated for each group by using the ordinary least squares [OLS]
residuals. Each matrix indicates that there exists some relationship
among the residuals over time.
The t-values for income measurement (A) for the regression coeffi-
cients for the OLS and SUR techniques are presented in Table 11. The
majority of the t-values in Table 11 are higher for the same regression
coefficient using SUR rather than OLS. Thus, the SUR technique appears
to do a better job estimating the regression coefficients.
We would anticipate that dividend behavior would vary by the
ownership arrangement of the insurer. Based upon the ownership arrange-
ment the OLS residuals associated with the shareholder dividend behavior
equation are uaed to estimate three variance-covariance matrices and
three correlation coefficient matrices. It is found that the relation-
ships among OLS residuals within each group are relatively strong. This
implies that Zellner's SUR method can be used to improve the efficiency
of the estimated shareholder dividend behavior relationship. The SUR
results for thiree ownership groups based upon income definition (D) are
listed in Table 12a - 12c.
Total Insurers .73
Group i .92
Group ii .69
Group ill .62
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-2
The R values under the regressions without policyholder dividends
-2
in Tables 12a - 12c are generally lower than the R values for the total
dividends presented in the third section of the paper. This is demon-
strated by the following:
-2 -2
R for Total Dividends R for Shareholder Dividends
.64
.89
.50
.60
These results imply that the earnings payout decision is made on
the basis of total policyholder and shareholder dividends rather than
considering these dividends separately. It is also found that SUR pro-
vides a more accurate estimation of the regression coefficients than
the OLS method.
Overall, we found that the prior dividend was the most important
variable explaining the level of current shareholder dividends under the
SUR technique. This variable was significant at the 5 percent level for
100, 68 and 63 percent of the group i, ii, and iii insurers respectively.
Next, the capacity ratio was found to be important in explaining share-
holder dividends for 53, 44, and 44 percent of the group i, ii, and iii
insurers, respectively. Similar percentages for current earnings were
59, 32, and 50 percent respectively.
The aggregated results for the equation (7) regression without
the dummy variable presented in Table 13 differ significantly from the
disaggregated results. This may be due to aggregation bias and/or the
equal weighting procedure in the individual company case. Also the
correlation coefficient between the lugged dividend and the capacity
ratio approximated a negative .8.
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VI. COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL OF A NON-LIFE INSURER
The cost of capital for a mercantile or manufacturing firm may
involve (1) the cost of debt, (2) cost of preferred stock, (3) the cost
of retained earnings, or (4) cost of a new issue of common stock. Items
(3) and (4) can be combined, and called the cost of equity. Launie [15]
has tried to find cost of capital counterparts for insurance companies.
While policyholder reserves may be viewed as a source of investable funds
for the non-life insurance industry, the assignation of an explicit cost
to these funds is a matter of debate. Policyholder funds are not considered
in our study. This is because such funds are not affected by dividend
policy. Rather, our analysis centers upon the cost of equity which is
directly related to shareholder dividends.
There are many ways to measure the cost of equity capital. In our
study, we will examine three widely accepted methods for measuring this
cost. These are (1) the earning yield method [18], (2) Gordon's method
[12], and (3) the capital asset pricing model method.
The cost of capital of a non-life insurance company may be viewed
as an opportunity cost involving the investment of shareholder funds in
the insurer rather than an alternative investment of similar financial
risk. This point of view follows the earning yield equation expressed
as
k = | (13)
where,
k cost of capital
E * earnings available to shareholders
P = market price of outstanding common stock.
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The capital market adjusts this yield ratio in order to bring it into
line with other investments of similar financial risk. The average
yields in our study for income measures A, B, C, and D are 6.58, 6.51,
7. 49, and 7.36 percent, respectively. The selective taking of realized
capital gains and the arbitrary adjustment of loss and loss adjustment
expense reserves may distort the reported earnings in a given year; the
investor in non-life insurance company equity may adjust the reported
earnings in light of his awareness of these accounting manipulations.
This affects the precision of the yield ratio in equation (13) as a cost
of capital measure.
The definition of insurer income is also obviously important to
this cost of capital definition. Foster [11] found that the capital
market takes into consideration an insurer's realized and unrealized
capital gains and losses in pricing its equity shares. It follows that
the insurer's income should include these gains and losses in deter-
mining its cost of capital. The other question is whether the GAAP
(generally accepted accounting principle) or the statutory basis of
measuring underwriting results is appropriate for earnings determination
purposes. GAAP underwriting earnings are assumed to be the most rele-
vant since they are reported to the shareholder and thus govern his
decision.
Another point of view holds that the cost of capital is a function
of the current dividend yield (dividends to shareholders dividend by the
price per common share) and an estimate of future growth or dividends.
In this model, retained earnings and dividends are viewed as financing
substitutes. The model takes the following form:
-2 7-
k = ^+g (U)
The definition of the components are found in equation (1), above.
To use Gordon's model to estimate the cost of equity capital, both
the dividend yield and the estimated growth rate of shareholder divi-
dends are required. The dividend yield of non-life insurer equity is
shown in Table 2.
Table 14 presents the continuous compound percentage growth rates
in shareholder dividends for the insurers studied. The model used to
calculate these growth rates is defined by the following:
log D.
t
= A + A
1
n
lt
+ Eit (15)
where,
D = total shareholder dividend for ith company in
period t
n, = number of years over which shareholder dividend
growth is compounded
E . = error term
A~ intercept
A, = growth rate estimator
The second two columns in Table 14 show a frequency distribution
of the shareholder dividend growth rates using a three year moving
average as the measurement base. The overall average growth rate under
this method is 9.74 percent. Furthermore, more than 50 percent of the
insurers had dividend growth rates within the range of zero to 12 per-
cent.
The third two columns in Table 14 portray a frequency distribution
of the dividend growth rates not using a moving average. The overall
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average growth rate under this method 9.20 percent which is very close
to the results obtained under the moving average technique. Again, over
50 percent of the insurers had dividend growth rates within the range of
zero to 12 per sent.
The overall average shareholder dividend yield in Table 2 is 3.38
percent. The addition of our growth rate estimate to this yield results
in a non-life insurance cost of capital estimate of approximately 12
percent over 1955-75.
A third approach to measuring the cost of equity capital of a
non-life insurer is found in the following equation:
where,
E(Rjt ) - E(Rft) + BjfECR^) - E(Rft)] (16)
E expectation operator and the other variables are
defined in equation (10), above.
In order to estimate equation (16), we need to estimate E(Rf ),
E(R ), and 8. We estimated E(R- ) by using the average Treasury Bill
rate over 1955-75 which was 5.28 percent. The betas for the 34 insurers
studied are presented in Table 9. The average beta was .85356.
The cost of capital estimate in equation (16) is dependent upon
the assumption regarding the expected market rate of return. If we
assume E(R ) equals 10 percent, then we obtain an average cost of
capital of 9.208 percent for the non-life insurers studied.
As a matter of additional interest, we analyzed the results of
equation 16 in light of Jensen's investment performance measure. From
the first column in Table 9, we see that most of the estimated a 's are
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negative. This Implies that the performances of non-life insurance
equity shares have not been superior to the market average.
In conclusion, the earnings yield method is too difficult to apply
as a cost of capital estimator for non-life insurance companies because
of (1) widely fluctuating earnings and (2) the presence of negative
earnings.
The Gordon model, on the other hand, can be more successfully
applied in estimating the non-life insurance cost of capital because
shareholder dividends are more stable over time than earnings. There-
fore, we had some success in using this model.
The CAPM approach also provides some insight into the cost of
capital in the non-life insurance industry. Theoretically the CAPM
model is the best way to measure the cost of capital; however, as a
practical matter the expected excess market rate of return is difficult
to determine objectively. The difference between the dividend growth
model and CAPM cost of capital estimates can be attributed to this
problem.
VII. SUMMARY
We have examined the shareholder and policyholder dividend policies
of a large sample of non-life insurers over 1955-75 in light of some
widely accepted financial models. These models were applied using four
definitions of income and three insurer ownership groups. Adjustments
were also made for capacity ratios and the partial and complete dividend
freezes in the early 1970' s.
Some of our specific findings are the following:
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(1) Earnings Payout Ratios and Dividend Yields
We found that unrealized capital gains and losses were viewed as
a transitory non-life insurance income component in the earnings payout
decision. This probably follows from the widely accepted accounting
practice of treating unrealized results as a surplus adjustment rather
than an income component. In addition, we found that the total average
earnings payout ratio was higher than 50 percent for statutory income
definitions.
The average shareholder dividend yield for all of insurers for
1955-75 was 3.38 percent. However, this yield fluctuated dramatically
over time. This was the result of non-life insurance common stock
prices tending to move in concert with the overall market during this
period.
(2) Lintner's Model
Lintner's dividend forecasting model was modified and applied to
the non-life insurance company sample. Regressions were run for both
total policyholder and shareholder dividends and the shareholder divi-
dends alone. On an overall basis, the ranking of the explanatory power
of the regressors was (1) the prior year's dividend, (2) the current
earnings, and (3) the capacity ratio. We also found a significant dif-
-2
ference in the R among the three ownership groups. It was also
determined that it takes approximately two years for non-life insurers
to adjust their total earnings payouts to desired target levels using
Lintner's formulation. The dummy variable for the partial and total
dividend freeze was also tested and found not to be important for the
great majority of insurers.
-31-
(3) Capacity Ratio
The cross-sectional and temporal average capacity ratios and
their coefficients of variation were calculated for the sample non-life
insurers. Over 50 percent of the insurers had average 1955-75 capacity
ratios ranging from .3 to .5. We also found wide variations in the
temporal coefficients of variation in the capacity ratios of the indi-
vidual insurers. This resulted from different compositions of under-
writing and investment portfolios and varying premiums written/capital
and surplus ratios among the insurers.
(4) Dividend Policy and Equity Value
The share price determination model and the modified security market
line model were used to study the impact of shareholder dividend policy
upon the market value of non-life insurance equity for the four income
definitions.
From 1955-68, shareholder dividends were found to have significant
impacts upon non-life insurance equity values. However, the results were
mixed for 1969-75. In years of high stock market volatility the impact
of dividend policy upon equity value was masked by other influences (e.g.,
unrealized capital gains and losses). The income definition did not
appear to be important in the share price determination model.
The security market line model was different from the share price
determination model in that the former was a temporal regression run
for the combined sample of insurers whereas the latter was a cross-sec-
tional year-by-year model. We found that shareholder dividends signi-
ficantly influenced equity value for income measures including unrealized
capital gains and losses in the security market line model. This finding
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is not entirely consistent with the results of the cross-sectional model
because the latter is static whereas the former is dynamic.
(5) SUR and Aggregate Behavior
The SUR is superior to the OLS regression method if the OLS resi-
duals among tha firms within the group are correlated. We found that
the SUR technique was superior to the OLS in estimating the dividend
determination behavior relationships for each of the three ownership
groups. This implies that there was some behavioral similarity in each
of these groups. The SUR findings were otherwise consistent with the
other findings in the paper.
The capacity ratio dominated the aggregate dividend determination
model. This result was at variance with the other results reported in
the paper. This may be due to aggregation bias.
(6) Cost of Capital
Three widely accepted cost of capital models were applied to our
sample insurers. Theoretically both the earnings yield model and CAPM
model are superior to Gordon's model in estimating the cost of capital.
However, the earnings yield model presented problems because of some
negative and widely fluctuating non-life insurer incomes. The CAPM
requires a good estimate of the expected market rate of return which
limit6 its usefulness. For these reasons, our cost of capital analysis
concentrated on Gordon's model. Our overall estimate of the cost of
non-life insurer equity capital was approximately 12 percent for this
model during 1955-75.
(7) Jensen Performance Measure
As a by-product of this research, our empirical CAPM results gave
us Jensen performance measure information for 34 non-life insurers with
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monthly stock price information. It was found that 88 percent of the
Jensen measures were moderately negative over 1955-75. This implies
that the common stocks of non-life insurers did not out perform the
overall market during this period.
-34-
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TABLE la
AGGREGATE EARNINGS PAYOUT RATIOS
Inaurer Group (i) Insurer Group (ii) Insurer Group (iii)
- El
b
E2
C
E3
d
E4
e
CO. El E2 E3 E4 CO. El E2 E3 E4
il .83 .96 .72 .81 01 .89 .97 .85 .92 02 .55 .65 .51 .60
14 .67 .63 .64 .60 03 .53 .56 .47 .49 05 .14 .08 .11 .07
17 .82 .91 .79 .88 04 .74 .76 .68 .70 06 .83 .72 .78 .68
24 .75 1.61 .63 1.13 07 .62 .63 .57 .58 08 .83 1.14 .80 1.10
30 .21 .28 .16 .19 09 .58 .40 .51 .37 13 .67 .74 .64 .69
33 ,71 .84 .58 .66 10 .53 .75 .53 .74 15 .66 .55 .49 .43
36 .99 1.22 .83 .99 12 .93 1.17 .78 .95 16 .36 .33 .35 .31
?8 .73 .79 .57 .61 18 .96 1.05 .83 .89 19 .23 .35 .23 .33
fcQ -.00 -.00 -.00 -.00 23 1.13 1.15 1.12 1.14 20 .64 .55 .60 .51
44 .59 .85 . .53 .72 25 .86 .80 .69 .65 21 .67 .88 .70 .93
45 .15 .15 .13 .13 31 .33 .35 .31 .33 22 .06 .06 .04 .04
4C .45 .28 .47 .29 34 .61 .66 .60 .65 26 .58 .62 .55 .58
52 .42 .49 .40 37 .86 .82 .82 .79 27 .84 .66 .72 .59
.73 .65 .50 .46 39 .21 .20 .20 .19 28 -1.21 -.92 -2.14 -1.37
.37 .V .31 .30 41 .32 .34 .27 .28 29 .55 .38 .47 .34
<C .77 .67 .68 .60 42 .97 1.26 .96 1.24 32 .11 .12 .10 .10
f .49 .29 .44 .28 43 .87 .76 .80 .71 35 .77 .71 .71 .66
50 .50 .42 .45 .38 47 .33 .32 .27 .26
52 .80 .86 .80 .86 49 .35 .32 .30 .28
53 .92 .80 .85 .75 51 .33 .30 .30 .28
54 .65 .76 .62 .71
55 .55 .50 .45 .42
57 .30 .30 .27 .27
59 .24 .30 .22 .26
d
rshiy gi.oupu (i), (il), and (iii) are defined in the text.
total 1955-75 dividends * total 1955-75 earnings as measured by definition (A) in text.
">tal 1955-75 dividends * total 1955-75 earnings as measured by definition (B) in text.
total 1955-75 dividends * total 1955-75 earnings as measured by definition (C) in text.
total 1955-75 dividends * total 1955-75 earnings as measured by definition (D) in text.
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TABLE lb
AVERAGE AGGREGATE 1955-75 EARNINGS PAYOUT
RATIOS BY OWNERSHIP GROUP
Insurer Group (1)
a
El" .611250
E2 .682499
E3 .529375
E4 .565625
Insurer Group (ii)
.662500
.690416
.610417
.636250
Insurer Group (iii)
.414500
.427999
.326500
.370499
Overall Average
.566166
.600833
.494166
.528833
See Table la for definitions of El, E2, E3, and E4 and see text for definition
of insurer ownership groups (i), (ii), and (iii).
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TABLE lc
F-TEST FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES AMONG
OWNERSHIP GROUPS IN AGGREGATE EARNINGS PAYOUT RATIOS
Income
Definition F-Value Probability
El
a 3.2285 4.696%
E2 3.3174 4.336
E3 2.7225 7.426
E4 2.9226 6.190
a
See Table la for definitions of El, E2, E3, and E4, and see text for
definitions of ownership groups (i), (ii), and (iii).
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Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
Overall
Average 3.38%
TABLE 2
NON-LIFE INSURER DIVIDEND YIELDS
Annual Average Sample
Dividend Yield (%) Size
2.90% 22
3.37 23
3.63 25
3.38 26
3.04 28
3.58 28
2.79 29
2.70 28
2.36 29
2.48 30
3.14 30
3.14 28
3.43 28
3.30 26
4.40 19
4.27 18
2.90 19
2.72 21
3.68 20
5.57 21
6.03 20
F-test results for average dividend yields among years 1955-75,
F - 5.3006 (significant at 1 percent level).
Year
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
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Table 3a
Average Capacity Ratios and Their Coefficients of
Variation (1955-1975)
Coefficient of Variation
.4249 .4552
.4040 .3988
.3760 .4282
.3960 .3874
.4192 .6171
.3903 .3941
.4202 .3796
.4010 .3850
.4064 .3889
.4093 .3997
.4007 .3894
.3742 .3979
.3844 .3858
.3872 .3597
.3595 .4412
.3571 .4439
.3766 .4033
.3960 .4006
.3472 .4502
.2794 .5845
.2799 .5858
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Table 3b
Frequency Distribution of 1955 ~ 1975 Coefficient Variation
for Average Capacity Ratio
AT AND LESS
LEAST THAN
- 0.1
0.1 - 0.2
0.2 - 0.3
0.3 - 0.4
0.4 - 0.5
Number of Firm Percentage
8 10.25
25 32.05
32 41.03
9 11.54
3 3.85
1.4 - 1.5 _L_ 1.28
78 100%
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Table 3c
Frequency Distribution of Average 1955 - 1975 Capacity Ratio
AT AND LESS
LEAST THAN
0.1 ~ 0.2
0.2 - 0.3
0.3 - 0.4
0.4 - 0.5
0.5 - 0.6
0.6 - 0.7
0.7 - 0.8
0.8 - 0.9
Number of Firm Percentage
2 2.56%
15 19.23%
36 46.15%
14 17.95%
.
4 5.13%
4 5.13%
2 2.57%
1 1.28%
78 100%
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TABLE 4a
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR EQUATION (7)-
INCCME MEASUREMENT (A)
Co. No.
a
a a, ao a -3 a / R
2
S.E.
b
o 1 2 3 4
(01) 28856 48347 1.0732 -.1909 -1477.9 .8705 22487
(1.03) C (2.73) (7.99) (-1.64) (-2.32)
(02) -2088.7 5311.6 .0615 1.0043 -88.1867 .9572 2179.9
(-.41) (1.48) (.84) (9.13) (-.63)
(03) -33600 -22349 .444 .4477 1615.8 .4771 18474
(-.87) (-1.79) (2.02) (1.55) (1.41)
(04) 41883 10161 .377 -.3301 -913.30 .8093 4100.4
(3.51) (1.99) (3.68) (-1.12) (-3.18)
(05) 111.92 21.052 -.0146 .5626 1.9058 .6159 103.67
(.36) (.26) (-.97) (3.37) (.19)
(06) 2224.4 89.114 -.012 .6742 -42.8317 .7374 499.14
(2.07) (.17) (-.11) (2.83) (-1.28)
(07) 4606.9 -2050.4 .1777 -.1215 -26.82 .9107 474.73
(4.69) (-5.05) (4.04) (-.83) (-1.51)
(08) -7201.8 957.27 -1.2438 .2049 224.87 .4194 2474.7
(-2.23) (.57) (-2.26) (.97) (2.56)
(09) 3209.8 1464.7 .1395 .9153 -144.21 .7183 1406.4
(.48) (.66) (1.32) (2.29) (-.79)
(10) -271.55 116.32 .0601 .2545 14.329 .5125 135.36
(-.79) (1.58) (1.57) (1.48) (1.33)
(11) 3651.3 -149.76 .1194 .7052 -103.72 .9865 632.16
(1.31) (-.22) (13.95) (5.71) (-1.39)
(12) 483.36 -342.8 -.0194 .4561 6.182 .5171 232.98
(.73) (-2.53) (-.47) (1.61) (.31)
(13) 371.99 -360.08 .1098 .7322 2.5613 .8936 294.38
(.48) (-1.23) (1.97) (3.98) (.13)
(14) -1146 -464.32 -.0279 .706 93.125 .9771 190.12
(-1.28) (-2.1) (-.4) (8.87) (2.66)
(15) 2595.05 -1705.75 -.1866 -.2681 -1.2436 .3308 1137.2
(1.29) (-2.61) (-1.09) (-.62) (-.02)
(16) 266.56 -11.34 .0031 .3117 .1542 .5612 29.8
(3.76) (-.56) (.42) (4.10) (.10)
(17) -6628 3664.6 .0089 1.1095 54.7184 .9825 1572.4
(-3.22) (2.28) (.35) (16.55) (1.89)
(18) 25089 7552.2 .4611 .1089 -633.14 .4185 9842.5
(2.22) (.92) (2.27) (.5) (-1.88)
(19) -234.61 511.6 .0602 .3044 -.0705 .1690 737.46
(-.09) (.97) (.27) (1.25) (-.00)
(20) 632.62 278.37 .0731 .5974 -21.454 .8193 204.76
(2) (2.31) (2.1) (4.42) (-2.75)
(21) -474.03 -83.623 -.0611 -.2239 21.8 .3824 336.77
(-1.28) (-.44) (-.45) (-.85) (2.64)
(22) -158.59 820.79 .0563 -.1037 -13.14 .75 294.31
(-.18) (1.68) (3.29) (-.52) (-.59)
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TABLE 4a (con't.)
Co. No. a
*1 a2 a3
a4
R
2
S.E.
(23) 236.36 -132.37 .2276 .6218 -.5987 .7821 174.42
(.94) (-1.04) (3.19) (4.45) (-.04)
(24) 76.332 -30.198 .0146 .7806 14.1488 .7048 386.83
(.12) (-.12) (.64) (4.84) (.75)
(25) 133.92 12.326 .0223 .3131 -1.3485 .75 12.874
(5.27) (1.09) (2.98) (3.00) (-2.73)
(26) 1011.7 12.994 .0561 .1079 -21.728 .3014 101.96
(2.98) (.21) (.76) (.57) (-2.05)
(27) 5649.4 946.63 .4176 .0973 -148.02 .7476 1004.5
(2.9) (.90) (2.68) (.33) (-2.7)
(28) 8211.5 -3162.3 .2192 1.1228 -119.34 .8404 2004.8
(4.58) (-2.72) (3.29) (5.77) (-3.03)
(29) -1563.5 -290.22 .2386 -.2357 54.328 .3096 219.41
(-2.36) (-1.41) (.78) (-1.11) (2.41)
(30) 22.086 -5.1426 .0515 .8264 -.0806 .9866 42.299
(.37) (-.10) (1.54) (5.42) (-.03)
(31) -12.87 -32.086 .13279 .3581 3.5981 .6896 141.45
(-.04) (-.19) (1.86) (1.83) (.42)
(32) 178.68 -113.31 .0212 .7986 -1.1135 .9422 92.144
(1.01) (-.89) (.93) (5.38) (-.73)
(33) 129.26 -16.705 .0661 .5398 -1.6399 .9359 18.196
(1.66) (-.98) (3.73) (2.66) (-1.11)
(34) 135.03 -193.11 .1684 .5969 6.5116 .9463 189.98
(.45) (-.92) (1.16) (1.78) (.56)
(35) 2240.8 3069.2 .8689 .2253 -161.74 .3504 6055.8
(.15) (.48) (1.30) (.80) (-.6)
(36) 59.841 5.7237 .0182 .7153 -.3979 .8378 14.71
(1.26) (.48) (1.44) (3.44) (-1.04)
(37) -20111 8985.1 1.1034 .4233 182.74 .6978 7045.5
(-1.3) (1.59) (4.08) (2.32) (.57)
(38) -7459.8 1379.9 -.0318 1.6049 195.75 .881 715.82
(-1.93) (1.69) (-.67) (4.49) (1.75)
(39) 799.85 -739.81 .0031 .0157 19.998 .9635 194.45
(6.78) (-6.59) (.81) (.32) (19.84)
(40) 7.3184 -42.759 .8356 1.7461 .7457 44.817
(.12) (-1.72) (-.61) (5.36) (.92)
(41) 1016.4 -908.3 .3012 -.5897 -2.7769 .8896 268.97
(1.48) (-1.62) (3.08) (-1.18) (-.43)
(42) 317045 122943 .3593 -.4354 -5716 .4084 109098
(2.16) (1.10) (.68) (-1.61) (-2.00)
(43) -989.77 351.41 2.1274 .174 -91.979 .8914 2095.4
(-.18) (.21) (9.03) (1.35) (-1.1)
(44) 4.7857 2.1733 .0333 .8963 -.0282 .9353 4.3958
(.48) (.33) (1.69) (10.1) (-.15)
(45) 823.23 -125.00 .0017 .7098 -8.739 .9362 76.1949
(2.02) (-1.57) (.54) (4.98) (-1.25)
(46) 27.2701 6.0099 .07781 .8345 -.3367 .9463 11.9968
(.32) (.65) (2.33) (8.11) (-.3)
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TABLE 4a ( con't.)
Co. No. a
o ,
a
l
a
2
a
4
a
4
R
2
S.E.
(47) 637.75 -397.18 .0201 -.4872 -5.936 .3842 205.65
(2.4) (-2.09) (.21) (-1.20) (-1.00)
(48) -171.78 198.29 .0038 1.1509 -1.8817 .984 126.47
(-.54) (1.37) (.22) (15.86) (-.27)
(49) 4.7876 3.1862 .0242 .9569 .0307 .9821 17.961
(.12) (.16) (3.99) (12.85) (.04)
(50) -53.344 -37.445 .0229 .6896 4.4049 .542 150.27
(-.22) (-.26) (.66) (2.21) (.68)
(51) -32.542 5.29 .0198 1.0743 .6195 .9766 25.401
(-.57) (.15) (2.02) (10.62) (.72)
(52) 3676 -1260.8 .5737 .089 -71.872 .8266 1026.1
(2.67) (-1.47) (3.41) (.48) (-1.34)
(53) 50783 -14548 -.4155 -.3623 -543.13 .5344 9389.4
(4.34) (-1.88) (-1.51) (-1.77) (-2.66)
(54)
.
-744.65 -757.48 -.0171 -.0399 56.1391 .0209 2652.4
(-.2) (-.31) (-.07) (-.16) (.53)
(55) 855.25 -146.2 .1232 .6583 -13.2631 .9582 265.47
(1.3) (-.45) (5.00) (4.74) (-1.24)
(56) 300.33 -40.63 .0843 1.0597 -7.668 .9382 67.948
(1.72) (-.47) (1.62) (5.97) (-2.09)
(57) -126.11 -153.88 -.0592 .7387 17.3201 .5249 192.4
(-.26) (-.92) (-1.83) (3.34) (1.44)
(58) 6.1672 -37.944 .0402 .8567 1.3717 .8506 40.326
(.07) (-.8) (.81) (4.55) (.67)
(59) 93.2801 8.5132 .024 .8533 -1.0067 .912 61.563
(.73) (.15) (.66) (4.69) (-.54)
(60) -9381.5 9615.2 .093 1.1848 -42.876 .988 2029.8
(-2.74) (3.77) (1.87) (17.65) (-.45)
(61) -356.07 -202.36 -.0227 1.1427 16.443 .9845 119.6
(-.75) (-1.37) (-1.13) (17.95) (1.37)
a
See Appendix A for company names.
Standard error of the estimate.
All values in parentheses are t-values.
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TABLE 4 b
EMPIRICAL PvESULTS FOR EQUATION (7)~
INCCME MEASUREMENT (B)
Co. No. a
o *1
a
2
a
3
a
4
R
2
S.E.
1
(01) 150110 51952 -.1288 -.2129 -2929.6 .4043 48228
(3.04) C (1.32) (-1.16) (-.84) (-2.16)
(02) 2554.5 3203.2 .01171 .9985 -149.5 .9593 2143.8
(.52) (1.82) (1.25) (9.57) (-.98)
(03) 6754.3 5570.5 .2513 .9506 -562.72 .4477 18987
• (.21) (.25) (1.73) (1.98) (-.46)
(04) 30593 2715.4 .0352 .1906 -546.94 .6579 5492.2
(1.78) (.38) (.68) (.54) (-1.32)
(05) 66.874 42.807 -.0036 .6021 1.7247 .6023 105.5
(.21) (.55) (-.60) (3.70) (.17)
(06) "3687.3 508.87 .038 .534 -89.815 .8593 365.44
(4.91) (1.66) (3.72) (4.11) (-4.25)
(07) 6336.4 -1515.8 .0191 -.1472 -62.0829 .8308 653.51
(5.29) (-2.65) (1.02) (-.71) (-2.87)
(08) -3477.8 326.51 -.0504 .1923 99.1839 .2386 2834.1
(-.96) (.17) (-.29) (.78) (1.18)
(09) 3260.2 307.77 .0196 .8944 -97.2 .6912 1472.5
(.45) (.14) (.43) (2.03) (-.50)
(10) -714.09 92.954 -.0124 .202 31.058 .4837 139.29
(-2.23) (1.27) (-1.2) (1.04) (3.14)
(11) -3647.4 1138.0 .1096 1.0603 79.0208 .9116 1616.8
(-.52) (.66) (4.03) (3.47) (.41)
(12) 614.2 -309.13 .0333 .4297 -.3479 .5362 228.32
(.99) (-2.31) (.94) (1.64) (-.02)
(13) 440.66 -599.83 .0117 .7543 10.0359 .8691 326.46
(.52) (-1.93) (.41) (3.49) (.45)
(14) -1082.5 -514.01 -.04 .705 94.2624 .9792 181.25
(-1.58) (-2.44) (-1.33) (10.56) (4.35)
(15) 3033.33 -1488.8 .148 -.5101 -28.94 .3026 1160.9
(1.52) (-2.16) (.71) (-1.16) (-.54)
(16) 269.57 -10.533 .0002 .314 .121 .5567 29.953
(3.62) (-.51) (.09) (4.12) (.08)
(17) -6545.8 3110.8 -.0059 1.1074 62.6387 .9827 1563.7
(-3.22) (1.84) (-.55) (16.78) (2.03)
(18) 16647 -4459.2 -.082 .2895 -126.99 .2678 11045
(1.21) (-.55) (-.90) (1.19) (-.33)
(19) -779.4 431.69 -.0276 .3055 9.8723 .1796 732.76
(-.29) (.9) (-.53) (1.27) (.24)
(20) 480.61 302.21 .0366 .6701 -17.622 .7863 222.66
(1.40) (2.26) (1.13) (4.56) (-2.11)
(21) -369.24 -94.245 .0907 -.0993 17.2483 .4075 329.87
(-1.00) (-.51) (.94) (-.37) (2.20)
(22) 351.63 -130.23 .0166 .3911 -.5758 .6617 342.4
(.36) (-.37) (1.95) (2.03) (-.02)
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TABLE 4b (con't.)
i. No. a
o
a
l
a
2
a
3
a
4
R
2
S.E.
(23) 148.49 -152.68 .1718 .6502 5.7944 .7428 189.47
(.55) (-1.11) (2.49) (4.29) (.39)
(24) 161.07 -20.127 .0116 .788 11.079 .7145 380.38
(.26) (-.08) (.99) (5.04) (.59)
(25) 115.53 7.0649 .0033 .3602 -.9082 .6225 15.8203
(3.7) (.48) (.69) (2.85) (-1.43)
(26) 871.45 -19.817 -.0665 .1841 -15.08 .3397 99.127
(2.92) (-.38) (-1.24) (1.04) (-1.76)
(27) 5817.2 451.35 .0667 .5923 -143.98 .8801 692.5
(4.35) (.74) (5.73) (3.30) (-4.14)
(28) 1019.9 -600.92 -.1396 1.4731 -12.491 .8536 1919.9
(.41) (-.47) (-3.64) (6.03) (-.27)
(29) -1470.5 -412.57 -.2246 -.2024 57.319 .371 209.43
(-2.34) (-2.15) (-1.5) (-1.01) (2.66)
(30)
.
-47.145 -43.862 -.0156 1.1138 6.5586 .9946 26.753
(-1.16) (-1.55) (-5.47) (26.07) (4.00)
(31) 602.66 -482.46 -.1115 .2082 3.0206 .6754 144.65
(1.79) (-3.00) (-1.62) (1.03) (.35)
(32) 323.75 -235.24 -.0356 1.1678 -1.0881 .9848 47.237
(5.39) (-5.48) (-6.94) (14.18) (-1.44)
(33) 135.73 -38.23 .0064 .5526 -1.1363 .8813 24.759
(1.24) (-1.71) (.41) (1.93) (-.56)
(34) 44.541 -82.777 -.0615 1.0534 6.1105 .9429 195.85
(.15) (-.41) (-.56) (4.66) (.51)
(35) 19397 -6084.7 -.2177 .0858 -297.98 .3006 6283.6
(2.22) (-1.26) (-.66) (.32) (-1.18)
(36) 54.029 -.2093 .0038 .7371 -.2343 .8189 15.542
(1.08) (-.02) (.45) (3.36) (-.6)
(37) 15496 -9756.1 -.161 .6057 -42.622 .4292 9683.7
(.91) (-1.5) (-1.12) (2.39) (-.09)
(38) -10331 1454.6 -.0481 1.7774 290.14 .9521 453.85
(-6.34) (2.89) (-4.99) (11.22) (6.46)
(39) 803.97 -743.97 .0029 .0164 19.942 .963 195.72
(6.65) (-6.5) (.66) (.33) (19.72)
(40) 7.3137 -42.756 .8356 1.7462 .7457 44.817
(.12) (-1.72) (-.61) (5.36) (.92)
(41) -88.228 127.48 .1444 .9333 -1.6062 .9481 184.44
(-.17) (.29) (6.18) (2.79) (-.37)
(42) 375205 110951 -.279 -.4939 -5776.7 .436 106520
(3.76) (1.04) (-1.13) (-2.1) (-2.32)
(43) 13537 -11652 -.4088 -.633 60.793 .7097 3426.1
(1.58) (-4.9) (-4.53) (-2.78) (.43)
(44) 2.1218 -9.6159 -.0064 .7787 .3088 .9439 4.0916
(.23) (-2.98) (-2.4) (9.09) (1.87)
(45) 624.73 -190.93 -.0016 .7647 -2.0468 .9548 64.102
(1.87) (-3.55) (-2.65) (6.44) (-.32)
(46) -29.258 -4.0494 -.0037 .9045 .6611 .9332 13.382
(-.29) (-.43) (-1.11) (8.38) (.5)
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TABLE 4b ( con't.)
Co. No. a
o
a
l
a
2
a
3
a4
R
2
S.E.
(47) 726.28 -510.36 -.0867 -.7267 -4.1234 .4538 193.69
(3.28) (-3.46) (-1.44) (-2.59) (-.73)
(48) -319.35 138.83 -.0078 1.1177 3.9857 .9887 106.37
(-1.27) (1.19) (-2.59) (17.95) (.80)
(49) -3.4372 -24.802 .0002 .9792 1.2709 .9644 25.355
(-.06) (-.91) (.08) (9.31) (1.07)
(50) -58.461 -63.615 -.0087 .6693 5.7903 .5327 151.787
(-.24) (-.43) (-.32) (2.11) (.89)
(51) 10.587 -32.542 .0005 1.0371 .8197 .9708 28.423
(.18) (-.93) (.15) (8.97) (.80)
(52) 1667.1 • ; -2781 -.1214 .4649 79.944 .7076 1332.3
(.96) (-2.67) (-.62) (2.06) (1.28)
"(53) 32863 -9929.7 -.2081 -.1692 -302.79 .6016 8685.5
(3.71) (-1.62) (-2.32) (-.85) (-1.5)
(54)
.
-689.22 -659.12 .0005 -.0411 52.667 .0206 2652.8
(-.17) (-.31) (0) (-.17) (.47)
(55) 1758.1 -956.64 .0101 .6461 -12.321 .8961 418.56
(1.7) (-2.02) (.70) (2.73) (-.73)
(56) 316.61 -132.44 -.0022 .9949 -4.8931 .9281 73.272
(1.68) (-1.85) (-.16) (5.34) (-1.36)
(57) -346.71 86.108 .0069 .6743 15.413 .4306 210.63
(-.67) (.64) (.38) (2.82) (1.03)
(58) 31.332 -57.926 .0142 .8494 1.3376 .8455 41.002
(.35) (-1.38) (.33) (4.32) (.63)
(59) 127.82 •' 32.954 .0362 .8447 -1.7911 .9126 60.986
(.94) • (.55) (.87) (5.11) (-.84)
(60) -10782 7021.0 -.0029 1.2364 102.55 .9856 2223.6
(-2.82) (2.82) (-.51) (18.56) (1.14)
(61) -450.33 -158.67 -.0107 1.1371 18.051 .9866 111.00
(-1.03) (-1.4) (-2.01) (19.8) (1.61)
See Appendix A for company names.
Standard error of the estimate.
C
A11 values in parentheses are t-values.
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TABLE 4c
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR EQUATION (7)-
INCOME MEASUREMENT (C)
Co. No.
(01)
(02)
(03)
(04)
(05)
(06)
(07)
(08)
(09)
(10)
(ID
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
28494
(.98)°
-1988.5
(-.4)
-26502
(-.67)
45669
(4.13)
118.2
(.39)
2166.8
(1.99)
4750.6
(4.59)
-5729.8
(-1.92)
3091.4
(.46)
-199.48
(-.58)
3207.5
(1.21)
548.95
(.83)
447.52
(.58)
-1076.3
(-1.15)
3721.4
(1.73)
266.74
(3.76)
-6600.2
(-3.21)
22243
(1.93)
-219.02
(-.09)
482.49
(2.19)
-445.47
(-1.22)
-241.43
(-.26)
44272
(2.41)
4673.7
(1.66)
-22557
(-1.75)
12562
(2.59)
6.0486
(.08)
58.044
(.11)
-2073.2
(-4.79)
577.22
(.34)
802.1
(.38)
138.15
(1.86)
.7872
(0.00)
-339.82
(-2.43)
-364.77
(-1.27)
-450.17
(-2.07)
-1879.6
(-2.48)
-11.036
(-.55)
3610.5
(2.26)
5898.4
(.71)
544.22
(1.02)
258.89
(2.73)
-102.64
(-.52)
713.49
(1.36)
a
2
1.0648
(7.65)
.0528
(.91)
.3826
(1.68)
.4276
(4.42)
-.0197
(-1.42)
-.0213
(-.20)
.1586
(3.58)
-1.08
(-2.06)
.13
(1.2)
.058
(1.87)
.121
(14.52)
-.008
(-.18)
.1183
(2.03)
-.0179
(-.25)
-.1113
(-.70)
.0029
(.39)
.0069
(.27)
.3993
(1.99)
.0859
(.38)
.1077
(3.99)
-.0748
(-.51)
.0434
(2.85)
-.1682
(-1.4)
1.0056
(9.31)
.4222
(1.42)
-.4709
(-1.68)
.5242
(3.16)
.6905
(2.83)
-.1362
(-.89)
.2115
(.98)
.804
(1.91)
.1878
(1.07)
.7001
(5.88)
.4286
(1.52)
.7074
(3.86)
.7026
(8.17)
-.2757
(-.60)
.3119
(4.1)
1.1101
(16.31)
.1413
(.64)
.3073
(1.27)
.6734
(7.56)
-.2278
(-.87)
-.1185
(-.54)
-1470.4
(-2.22)
-69.581
(-.52)
1399.4
(1.20)
-1033.8
(-3.83)
3.2085
(.33)
-40.642
(-1.20)
-28.802
(-1.53)
194.92
(2.34)
-116.06
(-.65)
12.542
(1.19)
-95.234
(-1.34)
3.9484
(.20)
.1954
(.01)
89.105
(2.44)
-32.121
(-.59)
.1437
(.10)
55.181
(1.91)
-542.91
(-1.63)
-1.2155
(-.03)
-19.134
(-3.44)
21.655
(2.72)
-7.8595
(-.34)
R
2
.8614
.9575
.4426
.8415
.6389
.7379
.9
.3951
.7134
.5382
.9875
.5116
.8948
.9769
.3021
.5606
.9824
.384
.1726
.8845
.3845
.7221
S.E.
23267
2190.2
19074
3738.0
100.52
498.71
502.39
2526.1
1418.6
131.74
609.18
234.32
292.64
190.71
1161.3
29.82
1574.9
10130
735.85
163.67
336.2
310.34
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TABLE *c (con't.)
Co. No.
a
r
a
o
a
l
a
2
a
3
a
4
R
2
S.E.
b
(23) 257.11 -144.81 .209 .6092 -.3752 .7732 177.94
(.99) (-1.12) (3.02) (4.26) (-.03)
(24) 59.713 -15.763 .0222 .7752 13.628 .7138 380.82
(.1) (-.06) (.97) (4.90) (.74)
(25) 127.76 12.407 .2229 .3137 -1.2331 .7537 12.777
(5.19) (1.11) (3.04) (3.03) (-2.61)
(26) 985.23 35.209 .0877 .1055 -22.173 .3198 100.61
• (3.14) (.51) (1.02) (.58) (-2.23)
(27) 3780.90 329.5 .242 .385 -88.453 . 7812 935.41
•
i (2.08) (.39) (3.28) (1.59) (-2.01)
(28) 7722 -2318 .4243 1.4513 -130.24 .8304 2066.7
(4.2) (-1.91) (3.04) (5.29) (-3.17)
(29) -1534.8 -332.72 .0433 -.2246 55.44 .2839 223.46
(-2.2) (-1.59) (.14) (-1) (2.4)
(30) 30.382 -9.6367 .0219 .9655 -.6622 .987 41,639
(.52) (-.19) (1.72) (12.66) (-.25)
(31) -.145 -42.656 .1295 .3553 3.4126 .6834 142.87
(0.00) (-.25) (1.76) (1.80) (.40)
(32) 95.369 -48.836 .0331 .7193 -.8599 .9462 88.896
-, (.53) (-.37) (1.46) (4.48) (-.58)
(33) 123.72 -17.098 .0622 .5472 -1.558 .9401 17.591
(1.64) (-1.05) (4.00) (2.79) (-1.09)
(34) 134.86 -185.09 .1586 .6218 5.9973 .9465 189.65
(.45) (-.90) (1.18) (2.01) (.52)
(35) 2925.8 1980.6 .7417 .2492 -151.15 .3441 6085.1
(.2) (.34) (1.24) (.85) (-.54)
(36) 64.301 6.9029 .0231 .6939 -.4615 .8536 13.976
.
! (1.43) (.63) (2.01) (3.50) (-1.27)
(37) -22350 8951.0 1.0854 .4968 216.43 .6944 7084.9
i (-1.4) (1.58) (4.03) (2.73) (.66)
(38) -7545.4 1406.5 -.0316 1.6164 198.44 ,8807 716.46
v (-1.85) (1.69) (-.65) (4.27) (1.67)
(39) 773.07 -715.33 .004 .003 19.648 .9647 191.39
(6.34) (-6.19) (1.09) (.66) (19.24)
(40) 7.3168 -42.76 -.0000 .8356 1.7462 .7457 44.818
(.12) (-1.72) (-.61) (5.36) (.92)
(41) 910.06 -872.8 .2906 -.6805 -1.5637 .9054 248.95
(1.42) (-1.68) (3.71) (-1.47) (-.26)
(42) 311976 115345 .4141 -.4366 -5601.60 .4163 108371
(2.27) (1.03) (.83) (-1.69) (-2.02)
(43) -3057.9 646.46 2.0729 .1635 -69.922 .8376 2562.3
(-.44) (.31) (7.02) (1.03) (-.68)
(44) 5.3459 2.0584 .031 .8966 -.0382 .9326 4.4843
(.53) (.28) (1.46) (9.79) (-.19)
(45) 828.88 -130 .0014 .705 -8.5471 .9358 76.422
CI. 98) (-1.63) (.45) (4.95) (-1.20)
(46) 10.16 13.84 .0972 .8582 -.3009 .9551 10.9674
(.13) (1.46) C3.ll) (9.70) (-.30)
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TABLE 4 c (con't.)
Co. No. a
o
a
l
a
2
a
3
a
4
R S.E.
(47) 621.09 -388.64 .0251 -.48 -5.7406 .3845 205.6
(2.05) (-1.86) (.23) (-1.17) (-.98)
(48) -219.98 176.6 -.0042 1.1504 .0013 .9841 126.33
(-.73) (1.24) (-.29) (15.88) (0.00)
(49) 2.4177 3.9369 .0249 .9423 .0852 .982 17.999
(.06) (.19) (3.97) (12.56) C.12)
(50) -50.78 -45.117 .0194 .6784 4.6002 .5391 150.74
(-.21) (-.31) (.57) (2.17) (.71)
(51) -38.242 10.318 .0207 1.0752 .6064 .9776 24.873
(-.68) (.29) (2.22) (10.88) (.72)
(52) 3673.2 -1412.3 .5411 .0882 -64.817 .8205 1043,8
(2.61) (-1.65) (3.27) (.46) (-1.21)
(53) 53832 -16048 -.5163 -.3576 -558.79 .5496 9234.7
(4.41) (-2.03) (-1.71) (-1.78) (-2.76)
(54) -651.53 -539.61 .0233 -.0433 48.996 ,0211 2652.1
(-.18) (-.23) (.09) (-.17) (.47)
(55) -887.64 540.36 .1879 .9066 4.6725 .9533 280.69
(-.97) (1.18) (4.55) (5.58) (.39)
(56) 255.82 .7133 .0842 1.0287 -7.5162 .9399 66.982
(1.46) (.01) (1.78) C6) (-2.13)
(57) -54.963 -138.16 -.0654 .7165 15.951 .5234 192.7
(-.11) (-.85) (-1.81) (3.26) CI. 31)
(58) 6.0466 -34.69 .039 .8464 1.2532 ,8532 39.969
(.07) (-.77) (.98) (4.52) C.61)
(59) 72.93 11.293 .0348 .8127 -.8208 .9127 60.97
(.58) (.21) (.87) (4.24) (-.45)
(60) -7482.7 10422 .1578 1.1236 -150.45 ,9909 1766.7
(-2.43) (4.78) (3.12) (17.45) (-1.57)
(61) -387.17 -185.34 -.0199 1.1401 17.041 .9841 120.87
(-.81) (-1.26) C-.96) (17.71) (1.38)
See Appendix A for company names.
Standard error of estimate.
"All values in parentheses are t-values.
-52-
TABLE 4d
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR EQUATION (7)-
INCOME MEASUREMENT (D)
Co. No.
a
a
o
a
l
a
2
a
3
a
4
R
2
S.E.
b
(01) 150075 52271 -.1307 -.2149 -2923.3 .4057 48172
(3.05) C (1.33) (-1.18) (-.85) (-2.15)
(02) 2537.0 3148.8 .0118 .9973 -147.64 .9594 2139.6
(.52) (1.81) (1.28) (9.57) (-.98)
(03) 7836.5 2386 .2246 .8778 -485.18 .4272 19336
(.24) (.11) (1.53) (1.8) (-.39)
(04) 31556 3202.1 . 03998 .1715 -574.64 .6602 5473.4
(1.82) (.44) (.76) (.48) (-1.36)
(05) 63.326 39.718 -.0041 .5963 2.1094 .6067 104.91
(.20) (.52) (-.74) (3.67) (.21)
(06) 3709.9 513.95 .0384 .5293 -90.524 .8599 364.57
(4 . 94) (1.68) (3.74) (4.08) (-4.28)
(07) 6327.2 -1522.9 .0192 -.1477 -61.885 .8307 653.68
(5.28) (-2.67) (1.02) (-.71) (-2.86)
(08) -3503.2 321.99 -.0566 .191 100.11 .2391 2833.2
(-.98) (.17) (-.31) (.77) (1.18)
(09) 3001.2 259.81 .0139 .8992 -87.014 .6899 1475.7
(.42) (.12) (.34) (2.00) (-.46)
(10) -728.71 88.022 -.0122 .2184 31.401 .4769 140.21
(-2.20) (1.20) (-1.10) (1.14) (3.03)
(11) -4573.2 1342.8 .1083 1.0777 101.9 .9094 1636.7
(-.65) (.78) (3.93) (3.5) (.53)
(12) 582.21 -286.68 .0436 .4453 -.532 .5534 224.07
(.96) (-2.14) (1.24) (1.73) (-.03)
(13) 447.92 -604.45 .0113 .7508 9.9918 .869 326.61
(.52) (-1.96) (.39) (3.5) (.45)
(14) -1085.2 -495.22 -.0358 .7081 93.168 .9788 182.83
(-1.57) (-2.36) (-1.22) (10.40) (4.27)
(15) 1947.9 -1250.8 .1345 -.5633 -2.2631 .311 1153.92
(.80) (-1.57) (.84) (-1.25) (-.04)
(16) 269.39 -10.544 .0002 .314 .1252 .5567 29.954
(3.61) (-.51) (.08) (4.12) (.08)
(17) -6553.1 3101.99 -.0063 1.1077 62.905 .9827 1561.7
(-3.23) (1.85) (-.59) (16.88) (2.05)
(18) 1676A -4555.4 -.0887 .2903 -123.45 .2728 11006
(1.24) (-.57) (-.96) (1.21) (-.33)
(19) -767.37 429.76 -.0271 .3055 9.737 .1787 733.16
(-.29) (.9) (-.51) (1.27) (.24)
(20) 449.92 268.99 .066 .6861 -17.466 .8254 201.25
(1.64) (2.26) (2.27) (6.14) (-2.55)
(21) -417.74 -73.906 .0742 -.1192 18.289 .4011 331.62
(-1.15) (-.4) (.84) (-.44) (2.41)
(22) 397.82 -167.67 .0133 .3383 -.5176 .6487 348.91
(.4) (-.47) (1.75) (1.77) (-.02)
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TABLE 4d (con't.)
Co. No.'
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
(46)
•S-2 „ „ b
a
o
a
l
a
2
a3 a4 R S.E.
169.66 -161.04 .1608 .6387 5.5918 .7383 191.13
(.62) (-1.16) (2.41) (4.18) (.37)
158.04 -21.044 .0127 .7892 10.874 .7191 377.34
(.25) (-.08) (1.12) (5.09) (.58)
114.34 6.9036 .0032 .3607 -.882 .6221 15.827
(3.72) (.47) (.67) (2.85) (-1.43)
933.44 -24.099 -.0564 .165 -16.79 .3274 100.04
(3.1) (-.45) (-1.11) (.94) (-1.98)
5389.8 461.73 .0653 .6239 -135.01 .8966 643.00
(4.37) (.82) (6.37) (3.74) (-4.26)
730.8 -749.77 -.1542 1.5306 -2.2192 .9067 1532.7
(.4) (-.77) (-5.47) (8.27) (-.06)
-1380.2 -415.24 -.2415 -.1702 55.011 .3999 204.56
(-2.23) (-2.23) (-1.76) (-.86) (2.62)
-54.767 -59.962 -.0172 1,1083 8.4267 .9945 27.185
(-1.31) (-2.09) (-5.34) (25.70) (4.50)
598.09 -477.06 -.1105 .2097 3.1283 .6789 143.88
(1.8) (-3.09) (-1.68) (1.05) (.36)
344.3 -256.43 -.0408 1.2701 -1.0833 .9887 40.779
(6.62) (-6.86) (-8.37) (16.40) (-1.66)
127.87 -36.507 .0099 .5726 -1.0519 .8832 24.559
(1.17) (-1.64) (.66) (2.01) (-.52)
51.188 -87.347 -.0439 1.0235 5.9664 .9427 196.61
(.17) (-.44) (-.43) (4.8) (.49)
19547 -5712 -.1817 .0731 -312.5 .2965 6302.0
(2.19) (-1.22) (-.59) (.27) (-1.25)
56.625 .8052 .0066 .7278 -.2786 .8235 15.346
(1.14) (.07) (.79) (3.35) (-.72)
15825 -9894.3 -.166 .5968 -43.195 .4303 9673.9
(.93) (-1.52) (-1.14) (2.37) (-.10)
-10623 1503.2 -.0494 1.8068 299.35 .9539 445.43
(-6.52) (3.04) (-5.15) (11.46) (6.64)
773.96 -716.73 .004 .0339 19.572 .9642 192.72
(6.15) (-6.03) (.98) (.66) (18.46)
7.312 -42.757 .8356 1.7463 .7457 44.818
(.12) (-1.72) (-.61) (5.36) (.92)
.-108.07 116.47 .1409 .8573 -1.0766 .9539 173.86
(-.22) (.28) (6.71) (2.77) (-.26)
172.765 116447 -.2548 -.4875 -5834.2 .4289 107190
(3.7) (1.09) (-1.03) (-2.05) (-2.32)
14033 -11969 -.4029 -.6258 54.768 .712 3412.3
(1.65) (-4.94) (-4.56) (-2.77) (.39)
2.0464 -9.7217 -.0063 .7783 .3127 .9442 4.08
(.22) (-3.01) (-2.43) (9.11) (1.9)
640.07 -190.01 -.0016 .7644 -2.4817 .9547 64.209
(1.92) (-3.53) (-2.64) (6.43) (-.39)
-•27.351 -4.2345 -.0036 .9036 .6396 .9329 13.412
(-.27) (-.45) C-1.08) (8.31) (.48)
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TABLE 4d (con't.)
fl -2 o r. b
Co. No. a
o
a
l
a
2
a
3
a
4
R S.E.
(47) 776.35 -533.61 -.1014 -.722 -4.7999 .4662 191.45
(3.43) (-3.55) (-1.58) (-2.65) (-.87)
(48) -297.4 139.89 -.0075 1.1199 3.4629 .9888 106.04
(-1.20) (1.20) (-2.61) (18.09) (.71)
(49) -3.9755 -25.019 .0001 .9788 1.2963 .9644 25.359
(-.07) (-.92) (.04) (9.32) (1.10)
(50) -60.077 -61.829 -.0093 .6732 5.7977 .5334 151.67,
(-.25) (-.42) (-.36) (2.13) (.90)
(51) 10.252 -31.864 .0006 1.0386 .8003 .9708 28.407
(.17) (-.91) (.2) (9.01) (.78)
(52) 1639.2 -2767.6 -.1239 .4704 80.491 .7075 1332.6
(.93) (-2.67) (-.62) (2.05) (1.27)
(53) - 32841 -9969.7 -.2129 -.1602 -299.05 .6043 8655.8
(3.72) (-1.63) (-2.35) (-.8) (-1.49)
(54) < -522.86 -609.44 .0129 -.0401 47.81 .0212 2652.1
. (-.13) (-.29) (.09) (-.16) (.43)
(55) 1836.3 -1028.2 .0055 .6224 -11.817 .8935 423.78
(1.62) (-1.95) (.30) (2.38) (-.69)
(56) 318.13 -132.3 -.0013 .9949 -4.9412 .9281 73.309
(1.69) (-1.81) (-.09) (5.33) (-1.37)
(57) -329.49 87.066 .0096 .6779 14.509 .4344 209.92
(-.64) (.66) (.51) (2.84)
.
(.97)
(58) 28.302 -52.645 .0192 .839 1.2422 .8473 40.766
(.32) (-1.28) (.54) (4.29) (.59)
(59) 110.98 49.493 .0537 .7961 -1.8472 .9156 59.952
(.88) (.78) (1.16) (4.58) (-.92)
(60) -10800 7039 -.0029 1.2369 102.7 .9856 2225
(-2.81) (2.82) (-.48) (18.57) (1.12) \*
(61) -463.25 -155.41 -.0105 1.1368 18.464 .9865 111.59
(-1.05) (-1.37) (-1.96) (19.70) (1.64)
See Appendix A for company names.
Standard error of estimate.
All values in parentheses are t-values.
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TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTIONS OF R
2
BY INCOME MEASURES (A), (B) , (C) , AND (D)'
—2
R
At And Less
Least Than
.10
.10 .20
.20 .30
.30 .40
.40 .50
.50 .60
.60 .70
.70. .80
.80 .90
.90 1.00
Percentage Distributions by
Income Definition
(A)
1.6%
1.6
0.0
9.8
6.6
9.8
4.9
13.1
18.0
36.1
(B)
1.6%
1.6
3.3
6.6
13.1
4.9
11.5
9.8
14.8
32.8
(C)
1.6%
1.6
1.6
11.5
3.3
9.8
4.9
13.1
16.4
36.1
(D)
1.6%
1.6
4.9
4.9
13.1
4.9
11.5
8.2
14.8
34.4
1
Income measures (A), (B)
,
(C) , and (D) are defined in the text;
R is derived from equation (7) in text.
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TABLE 6
-2
F-TEST FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE IN R
AMONG OWNERSHIP GROUPS
Ownership Group
.
(i)
a
(ii)
(ill)
Overall
Average
—2
Average R F Value
.917705
.690487 9.0361
b
.623534
.731858
See text for the definition.
Significant at .038% level.
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Table 7
AVERAGE 1955-75 RATIOS OF POLICYOWNER DIVIDENDS TO TOTAL DIVIDENDS
INA
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY
AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY
FEDERAL
AMERICAN STATES
ROYAL INDEMNITY
WESTCHESTER FIRE
PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
PEERLESS
EMPLOYERS FIRE
EMPLOYERS CASUALTY
UNITED PACIFIC
AMERICAN GENERAL
RELIANCE
AFFILIATED FM
CONNECTICUT INDEMNITY
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY
CALIFORNIA COMPENSATION AND FIRE
HANOVER
AMERICAN POLICYHOLDERS .
GLOBE INDEMNITY
PACIFIC
TRI STATE
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES
WEST AMERICAN
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE
AMERICAN DRUGGISTS
THE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY
BITUMINOUS CASUALTY CORPORATION
THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY
THE CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY
HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY
PACIFIC EMPLOYERS
PHOENIK INSURANCE COMPANY
REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY
SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY
TRINIT? UNIVERSAL
UNITED FIRE AND CASUALTY
UNITED STATES FIDELITY & GUARANTY
WESTERN CASUALTY AND SURETY
Mean
.0170
.0979
.3133
.0409
.0033
.1010
.0824
,1106
.2366
.1461
.1544
.7680
.1237
,0379
.0259
1.000
.1981
1.000
.9440
.0418
.7301
.0912
.0879
,2190
.1139
1.000
.7339
.0694
.3692
.2413
.0096
.0183
.6176
.6764
.1001
,0041
,0025
.0301
,1718
.0356
.0712
,0237
,0986
.4016
.0288
.0102
.1070
.0991
.2899
.0808
.2194
,2227
.0341
.2962
.0255
.0445
.3853
.0360
.0627
,0799
,0956
,2163
.3574
.1858
.4040
.0813
.4306
.1379
.0207
.0334
.4633
.1208
.1313
,0107
.0086
,4426
,2490
,0428
.0878
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TABLE 8
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR CROSS-SECTIONAL
PRICE PER SHARE REGRESSIONS [EQ.(8)]
Year
1955 A
1
.1
1956 A
1957 A
1958 A
B
1959 A
Retained Dividends
Earnings Per
—2
''
Constant Per Share
1.67
Share
17.809
R Sample Size
26.668 .257 21
(2.278) (.46) (2.729)
27.471 1.889 10.626 .283
(2.57) (.947) (1.011)
27.129 -.0719 18.768 .249
(2.348) (-.025) (2.851)
26.746 1.258 13.13 .265
(2.471) (.641) (1.227)
16.163 1.4 19.928 .528 23
(2.241) (.832) (4.691)
15.316 .209 20.633 .513
(2.106) (.184) (4.747)
15.276 1.214 20.205 • .521
(2.131) (.631) (4.747)
15.173 .008 20.855 .512
(2.097) .,(.006) (4.812)
18.126 -.318 16.825 .375 25
(2.595) (-.247) (4.026)
18.271 -.154 16.406 .374
(2.609) (-.182) (3.358)
18.17 -.303 16.900 .374
(2.601) (-.22) (4.043)
18.278 -.134 16.497 .374
'
(2.606) (-.156) (3.438)
17.531 .565 19.036 .473 26
(2.541) (.633) (4.853)
18.574 .509 15.239 .486
(2.683) (.982) (2.728)
17.505 .659 18.812 .478
(2.549) (.774) (4.787)
18.615 .545 14.795 .49
(2.703) (1.072) (2.627)
25.653 2.369 16.561 .247 27
(2.74) • (1.017) (3.068)
28.043 3.083 9.685 .263
(3.113) (1.271) (1.245)
27.282 .833 16.342 .22
(2.906) (.384) (2.886)
28.304 1.453 12.734 .227
(3.057) (.591) (1.432)
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TABLE 8 (<:on' t.)
Retained Dividends
Earnings Per
R
2
Year
A
Constant
16.33
Per Share
4.143
Share
18.307
Sample Size
1960 .502 28
(2.08) (1.755) (3.384)
B 16.618
(2.189)
4.413
(2.202)
18.116
(3.594)
.531
C 17.006
(2.195)
4.203
(2.023)
16.411
(2.898)
.519
D 16.437
(2.147)
3.372
(2.081)
17.892
(3.444)
.523
1961 A 20.141
(2.121)
-.811
(-.604)
26.267
(4.754)
.429 29
B 16.667
(1.781)
-.375
(-1.453)
31.911
(4.84)
.465
C 20.041
(2.101)
-.642
(-.442)
26.439
(4.764)
.425
D 16.65
(1.777)
-.379
(-1.44)
32.068
(4.8)
.464
1962 A 14.678
(1.475)
-.38
(-.157)
31.395
(4.503)
.506 28
B 14.923
(1.586)
-.452
(-.382)
29.78
(4.816)
.509
C 16.073
(1.684)
1.126
(.484)
28.965
(4.304)
.51
D 15.185
(1.614)
-.079
(-.062)
30.576
(4.831)
.506
1963 A 38.902
(2.638)
11.366
(2.741)
12.461
(1.115)
.264 29
B 50.868
(3.336)
5.79
(2.967)
-14.811
(-.909
.292
C 33.701
(2.235)
11.034
(2.463)
15.045
(1.342)
.231
D 48.369
(3.194)
5.874
(2.875)
-14.147
(-.858)
.281
1964 A 7.617
(.602)
1.937
(.841)
40.946
(3.887)
.402 30
B 9.906
(.912)
6.122
(3.145)
21.813
(1.971)
.551
C 10.419
(.846)
3.597
(1.678)
35.548
(3.308)
.444
D 11.97
(1.169)
6.262
(3.863)
16.958
(1.597)
.605
1965 A 9.02
(.771)
8.324
(3.332)
28.629
(3.087)
.48 30
B 1.897
(.161)
4.943
(3.037)
33.442
(3.629)
.453
C 7.958
(.653)
6.714
(2.827)
27.415
(2.762)
.433
D 2.103
(.173)
4.219
(2.704)
32.193
(3.365)
.422
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TABLE 8 (con't.)
Retained Dividends
Earnings Per
R
2
Year
A
Constant
9.956
Per Share
6.31
Fhare
17.385
Sample Size
1966 .36 28
(.688) (2.054) (1.149)
B 1.182
(.08)
.927
(.635)
40.98
(3.381)
.26
C 10.575
(.792)
8.24
(2.873)
11.125
(.79)
.435
D .858
(.058)
1.318
(.911)
41.892
(3.481)
.273
1967 A 3.331
(.365)
13.798
(6.558)
17.417
(2.305)
.717 28
B -1.124
(-.099)
6.14
(4.299)
16.17
(1.63)
.558
C .339
(.041)
13.9
(7.497)
16.223
(2.341)
.763
D -2.525
(-.228)
6.266
(4.603)
15.282
(1.586)
.584
1968 A 8.79
(1.003)
14.269
(8.245)
11.87
(1.824)
.79 26
B -2.483
(-.25)
7.723
(7.037)
16.212
(2.277)
.737
C 6.393
(.768)
13.547
(8.828)
11.159
(1.801)
.811
D -3.597
(-.375)
7.577
(7.416)
15.543
(2.258)
.755
1969 A 21.043
(2.163)
19.168
(7.843)
-.285
(-.047)
.773 19
B 26.168
(.98'.)
-3.141
(-.381)
9.661
(.706)
-.089
C 30.932
(2.711)
16.455
(6.256)
-16.519
(-2.032)
.681
D 29.87
(1.075)
-.997
(-.136)
9.715
(.563)
-.097
1970 A 3.839
(.182)
16.305
(5.505)
9.229
(.498)
.663 18
B -4.056
(-.215)
14.667
(6.466)
16.645
(1.028)
.731
C 2.376
(.126)
14.986
(6.473)
5.176
(.31)
.732 -
D -4.751
(-.28)
13.498
(7.431)
12.602
(.859)
.783
1971 A 12.742
(.684)
15.357
(3.514)
• -2.671
(-.147)
.4 19
B 19.151
(.996)
9.518
(3.126)
-20.704
(-.938)
.336
C 8.063
(.436)
15.012
(3.703)
-1.275
(-.073)
.424
D 15.81
(.835)
9.664
(3.32)
-20.774
(-.976)
.367
-61-
TABLE 8 (con't.)
Retained Dividends
Earnings Per
_2
Year
A
Constant
-11.998
Per Share
33.404
Share
-18.724
r Sample Size
1972 .666 21
(-.607) (6.45) (-.906)
B 12.938
(.511)
10.236
(3.851)
-3.639
(-.133)
.393
C -14.862
(-.743)
31.461
(6.429)
-20.555
(-.99)
.664
D 10.655
(.426)
10.396
(4.009)
-5.037
(-.187)
.415
1973 A 17.454
(.988)
10.438
(1.996)
-6.037
(-.338)
.095 20
B 49.114
(2.366)
-9.464
(-1.685)
-45.617
(-1.36)
.043
.
C 15.022
(.85)
11.09
(2.153)
-8.131
(-.457)
.122
D 49.596
2.298
-9.034
(-1.569)
-42.168
(-1.257)
.025
1974 A 18.903
(1.36)
.06
(.051)
3.234
(.238)
-.108 21
B 22.921
(1.777)
-1.647
(-1.711)
-8.616
(-.601)
.029
C 18.71
(1.345)
.145
(.126)
3.315
(.244)
.047
D 22.934
(1.765)
-1.586
(-1.633)
-8.089
(-.561)
-.107
1975 A 15.663
(1.214)
1.684
(.476)
4.218
(.313)
-.085 21
B 12.711
(1.465)
8.162
(4.588)
-20.846
(-1.962)
.494
C 16.383
(1.307)
3.878
(1.026)
2.46
(.187)
-.038
D 10.822
(1.421)
8.868
(5.741)
-22.199
(-2.416)
.612
Income definitions (A), (B), (C), and (D) are found in the text.
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Table 9
CAPM RESULTS FOR 34 NON-LIFE INSURERS
Name of firms
*i
e
i
R
2
1. Ohio Casualty -.0370
(-1.2117)
.9008
(10.9193)
.32108
2. Government Employees .01162
(1.5993)
1.10367
(20.8164)
.6336
3. Peerless -1.4310
(-1.0020)
920974
(8.8381)
.2357
4. Employers Casualty -.01705
(-2.3289)
.8979
(16.8137)
.5298
5. Hanover -.00665
(-.21840)
.97981
(4.4044)
.0685
6. American Reinsurance .00008
(.01390)
1.01186
(22.27882)
.66459
7. General Reinsurance -.00324 .96390 .63183
Corporation (-.50865) (20.73732)
8. Hartford Steam Boiler -.00945 .93706 .49022
Inspection & Ins. Company (-1.14279) (15.53732)
9. Northeastern Insurance -.00756 .94324 .32766
Company of Hartford (-.64796) (11.08314)
10. Limited State Fidelity -.010831 .92272 .7506
and Guaranty (-2.3517) (27.4544)
11. Western Casualty -.00489 .96588 .63939
and Security (-.77861) (21.0776)
12. INA -.00573
(-.48697)
.95994
(7.05849)
.37320
13. Continental Insurance -.01690
(-1.6245)
.81461
(4.76874)
.35339
14. Providence Washington -.00899
(-1.01844)
.93329
(11.66852)
.4415
15. National Casualty -.02164
(-1.5960)
..63575
(3.36616)
.34061
16. American General .00364
(.27921)
1.04741
(12.12186)
.44367
17. American Banker .005064
(.24745)
1.05495
(8.66406)
.36118
18. Excelsior -.00847
(-1.27783)
.93629
(18.4566)
.5962
19. American Insurance -.01776
(-1.5583)
.85299
(6.56839)
.20072
20. Cincinnati Insurance -.05523
(-1.0853)
.58827
(1.59720)
.02331
21. Eagle Insurance -.01142
(-1.80376)
.90504
(16.5585)
.60548
22. Fidelity and Deposit -.04294 .54486 ,25279
Comp. of Maryland (-5.61351) (6.70682)
23. Firemen' 8 Insurance of -.00898 .90359 .46533
Washington, D.C. (-.97779) (8.50678)
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(Table 9 cont.)
Name of firms
24. Germantown Insurance
25
.
Harbor
26. Interstate Fire and
Casualty
27. Phoenix Insurance
Company
28. Reinsurance Company
of New York
29. Republic Insurance
30. Trinity Universal
31. United Fire Insurance
32. Aetna Casualty and
Surety
33 Federal
34. Westchester Fire
Average B.
-.016446
(-2.76785)
-.04347
(-1.78517)
-.020696
(-1.3388)
-.01005
(-1U0792)
-.012833
(-2.03977)
-.00771
(-1.28416)
-.019852
(-2.38160)
-.00987
(-.34752)
-.02620
(-3.4385)
-.058592
(-10.82971)
-.06815
(-7.36746)
6
4
.86277
(17.50472)
.632165
(3.24843)
.820319
(6.77994)
.93025
(10.09309)
.88139
(14.85714)
.95883
(18.33521)
.852098
(11.36800)
.98921
(6.33789)
.70124
(8.9312)
.39363
(8.65567)
.32933
(4.20722)
.85356
R
2
.59511
.11165
.27258
.42228
.57562
.65442
.42711
.33429
.38467
.32576
.099
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Table 10
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR (9) FOR AGGREGATE FIRMS
Income
Definition
B
Regression Coefficients
a
o
a
l
a
2
.965
(26.47)
.048
(1.16)
-.00004
(-.10)
.935
(28.51)
.039
(1.07)
.0608
(3.25)
.946
(23.69)
.049
(1.21)
.034
(1.06)
9.37
(26.47)
-
.045
(1.17)
.056
(2,41)
T See text for definitions.
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lable 11
REGRESSION T-VALUES FOR CROSS-SECTIONAL RESULTS
FOR EQUATION (11) - INCOME MEASUREMENT (A)
Regression Coefficients
Year al bl cl
1955 OLS 2 2.278 .46 2.729
(SUR) (2.880) (.303) (2.509)
1956 OLS 2.241 .832 4.691
(SUR) (1.442) (1.601) (17.986)
1957 OLS 2.595 -.247 4.026
(SUR) (2.85G) (-.431) (4.121)
1958 OLS 2.541 .633 4.853
(SUR) (3.609) (1.454) (3.270)
1959 OLS 2.74 1,017 3.068
(SUR) (1.133) (2.094) (11.336)
1960 OLS 2.08 1.755 3.384
(SUR) (1.347) (1.016) (6.907)
1961 OLS 2.121 -.604 4.754
(SUR) (1.819) (-3.519) (12.516)
1962 OLS 1.475 -.157 4.503
(SUR) (1.304) (1.364) (8.956)
1963 OLS 2.638 2.741 1.115
(SUR) (2.700) (5.906) (.544)
1964 OLS .602 .841 3.887
(SUR) (.387) (-.409) (6.231)
1965 OLS .771 3.332 3.087
(SUR) (1.095) (6.090) (1.617)
1966 OLS .688 2.054 1.149
(SUR) (1.074) (3.260) (.089)
1967 OLS .365 6.558 2.305
(SUR) (.301) (8.467) (3.005)
1968 OLS 1.003 8.245 1.824
(SUR) (.881) (16.721) (1.016)
1969 OLS 2.163 7.843 -.047
(SUR) (2.477) (8.835) (-.457)
1970 OLS .182 5.505 .498
(SUR) (-.956) (7.281) (2.716)
1971 OLS .684 3.514 -.147
(SUR) (1.017) (4.659) (-.158)
1972 OLS -.607 6.45 -.906
(SUR) (-.376) (8.403) (-1.332)
1973 OLS .988 1.996 -.338
(SUR) (.934) (4.245) (-.469)
1974 OLS 1.36 .051 .238
(SUR) (.482) (-.098) (2.322)
1975 OLS 1.214 .476 .313
(SUR) (.619) (.705) (1.323)
Ordinary least squares regression,
I
Seemingly unrelated regression
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Table 12a
OLS and SUR Shareholder Dividend Behavior (Group i)
Income Lagged Capacity
Co. No.
8
Constant Measure Dividend Ratio
11 (OLS) 591.32 .1043 .8639 -1898.3
(.11)° (3.88) (3.43) (-.11)
(SUR) 1988.61 .1168 .7570 -5859.38
(.80) (8.37) (5.52) (-.71)
14 (OLS) -309.98 -.0092 1.1032 1253.2
(-2.15) (-1.04) (18.18) (1.99)
(SUR) -284.51 -.0044 1.0528 1220.6
(-3.87) (-.73) (25.08) (3.85)
17 (OLS) -524.73 -.0130 1.0113 9161.19
(-2.37) (-1.23) (25.23) (2.99)
(SUR) -5379.25 -.0116 1.0172 924.10
(-5.18) (-2.12) (34.13) (7.12)
24 (OLS) -108.00 .0142 .8682 1319.10
(-.22) (1.36) (6.36) (.97)
(SUR) -191.78 .0189 .9354 1162.67
(-.50) (2.36) (10.11) (1.08)
30 (OLS) -107.73 -.0167 1.1820 752.29
(-2.90) (-4.70) (40.30) (3.73)
(SUR) -114.12 -.0184 1.1954 783.81
(-4.75) (-8.50) (50.32) (6.37)
33 (OLS) 34.56 .0197 .9109 -49.54
(.30) (1.38) (3.02) (-.24)
(SUR) 25.82 .0261 .9070 -28.52
(.61) (3.55) (7.94) (-.37)
36 (OLS) 18.29 -.0040 .8054 16.64
(.32) (-.37) (2.87) (.42)
(SUR) -2.93 .0050 .8948 30.36
(-.11) (.80) (7.91) (1.27)
38 (OLS) -7895.4 -.0465 1.4497 27703.4
(-4.61) (-3.89^ (10.69) (4.98)
(SUR) -7221.02 -.0371 1.4361 24974.4
(-8.58) (-4.63) (19.65) (8.84)
40 (OLS) -67.64 -.0000 .9354 328.46
(-1.05) (-.15) (6.11) (1.38)
(SUR) -33.80 -.0000 .8467 212.16
(-1.00) (-2.25) (9.63) (1.86)
44 (OLS) 6.00 -.0039 .9243 1.1567
(.49) (-1.28) (10.71) (.07)
(SUR) 9.29 -.0032 .9228 -4.1871
(1.06) (-1.63) (13.83) (-.33)
45 (OLS) 693.30 -.0010 .8322 -1260.59
(1.36) (-1.30) (4.57) (-1.49)
(SUR) 606.49 -.0009 .8161 -894.71
(2.46) (-1.75) (9.14) (-2.01)
46 (OLS) -62.30 -.0038 .9229 99.45
(-.52) (-1.10) (9.79) (.63)
(SUR) -30.58 -.0016 .9285 58.35
(-.47) (-.79) (14.43) (.68)
.8635
.9787
.9772
.7289
.9929
.8793
.5609
.9231
.7040
.8997
.9117
.9259
D.W.
2.25
3.24
1.67
1.87
2.2:
2.18
1.67
1.34
1.46
1.83
2.00
2.27
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Table 12a (Cont.)
Income Lagged Capcity
Co,. No. Constant Measure Dividend Ratio
48 (OLS) -181.24 -.0081 1.0550 534.61
(-.73) (-2.73) (34.08) (1.05)
(SUR) -254.74 - -.0076 1.0505 693.48
(-1.55) (-4.09) (44.08) (2.11)
56 (OLS) -87.11 -.0055 1.3765 118.19
(-1.35) (-.94) (26.94) (.75)
(SUR) -71.22 -.0045 1.3610 83.45
(-2.78) (-1.19) (36.47) (1.49)
58 (OLS) 27.85 .0458 .9542 106.79
(-.35) (1.43) (4.67) (.42)
(SUR) -47.10 .0348 .9450 190.74
(-1.59) (2.77) (12.03) (2.15)
60 (OLS) -5128.44 -.0055 1.0602 17982.6
(-1.29) (-.78) (21.99) (1.71)
(SUR) -6735.36 -.0070 1.0660 22571.5
(-2.99) (-1.94) (29.83) (4.01)
61 (OLS) -898.22 -.0090 1.1929 2536.00
(-2.87) (-1.64) (23.68) (2.45)
(SUR) -745.80 -.0122 1.1994 2106.05
(-5.72) (-3.85) (36.56) (5.32)
.9869
.9855
.8429
.9727
.9843
D.W.
1.68
2.43
2.67
.88
1.64
See Appendix A for company names.
Durbin-Watson statistic.
"All values in parentheses are t-values.
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Table 12b
OLS and Shareholder Dividend Behavior (Group ii)
Income Lagged Capacity
Co. No. Constant Measure Dividend Ratio
01 (OLS) 119682 -.1712 -.0692 -148071
(2.47)C (-1.52) (-.29) (-1.55)
(SUR) 82518.7 -.1384 .0866 -81906.7
(4.29) (-3.69) (1.07) (-2.55)
03 (OLS) 9649.99 .2185 .8448 -46677.5
(.34) (2.49) (2.57) (-.51)
(SUR) -239.92 .1919 .7774 -7211.36
(-.02) (5.03) (7.15) (-.16)
05 (OLS) 245867 .0307 .2559 -38892.9
(2.16) (.74) (.88) (-1.93)
(SUR) 22232.2 .0159 .3080 -34305.9
(5.74) (.99) (3.40) (-4.99)
09 (OLS) . 4080.79 .0194 .0178 -5281.10
(3.68) (.68) (.07) (-2.92)
(SUR) 3843.23 .0148 .0109 -4642.68
(9.69) (1.65) (.25) (-5.97)
10 (OLS) -3387.54 -.0437 .1796 10289.9
(-.85) (-.22) (.75) (1.25)
(SUR) -4535.79 -.1163 .2366 12465.1
(-1.49) (-.76) (1.58) (2.01)
11 (OLS) 3499.71 .0145 .8588 -9395.49
(.64) (.35) (4.55) (-.53)
(SUR) 3804.98 .0177 .7668 -9651.8
(2.96) (1.08) (10.99) (-2.49)
12 (OLS) -907.67 -.0069 .5698 3333.94
(-2.89) (-.66) (2.72) (3.43)
(SUR) -898.37 -.0080 .6088 3252.27
(-5.96) (-1.45) (6.11) (7.48)
15 (OLS) 144.24 .0810 .6539 102.74
(.19) (1.55) (2.22) (.04)
(SUR) 684.83 .0251 .4543 -1514.12
(1.59) (.75) (2.67) (-.93)
21 (OLS) 16138.1 -.0863 .2700 -18781.7
(1.28) (-.97) (1.12) (-.68)
(SUR) 12488.4 -.0905 .3474 -11631.0
(3.09) (-3.30) (4.96) (-1.57)
30 (OLS) 19.60 .0006 .0766 6.08
(3.05) (.37) (.36) (.21)
(SUR) 15.85 .0004 .2217 9.17
(6.49) (.80) (2.86) (1.08)
35 (OLS) -41.83 -.0010 1.1252 62.41
(-1.14) (.36) (6.29) (1.68)
(SUR) -23.88 .0008 1.0531 41.20
(-1.60) (.48) (14.47) (2.34)
46 (OLS) 81.53 -.0000 .6858 91.68
(.22) (-1.10) (3.79) (.08)
(SUR) 70.62 -.0000 .7202 94.01
(1.02) (-7.64) (12.25) (.52)
.3144
.3835
.6158
.4293
.2122
.6784
.5831
.2573
.2177
.0365
.8347
.5257
D.W.
1.58
2.05
1.69
2.23
2.28
2.50
2.42
2.12
1.95
2.12
2.29
1.71
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Table 12b (Ccmt.)
Income Lagged Capacity
Co. No. Constant Measure Dividend Ratio
54 (OLS) -34.60 -.0490 1.0772 580.24
(-.14) (-.48) (6.30) (.47)
(SUR) 71.61 -.0436 1.1326 -74.43
(1.03) (-1.75) (21.96) (-.27)
62 (OLS) 19644.7 -.0637 .5553 -34996.6
(1.20) (-.46) (2.14) (-.92)
(SUR) 7034.56 -.1354 .5427 -2628.08
(.79) (-1.53) (5.72) (-.13)
64 (OLS) 22.57 .0189 .1583 1755.48
(.18) (2.82) (1.71) (8.92)
(SUR) 8582.05 .0201 .1204 1896.85
(0) (5.64) (3.15) (23.81)
66 (OLS) 57.39 .1387 .7461 -229.84
(.33) (7.96) (8.29) (-.52)
(SUR) 13.10 .1391 .7406 -101.29
(.24) (23.20) (21.17) (-.86)
67 (OLS) 315426 -.3538 -.3978 -336993
(5.37) (-1.47) (-1.72) (-2.38)
(SUR) 26.3195 -.1670 -.2350 -284826
(4.41) (-1.21) (-1.66) (-3.31)
69 (OLS) 18*160.4 -.2529 -.2543 -20519.5
(1.37) (-1.95) (-.76) (-.98)
(SUR) 18^0.84 -.2797 .2377 4566.24
(.20) (-2.94) (1.05) (.32)
77 (OLS) -138.01 -.0087 .7668 636.62
(-.65) (-.34) (4.09) (.98)
(SUR) -103.06 -.0291 .7464 569.95
(-.60) (-1.28) (4.63) (1.08)
81 (OLS) -913.65 -.1186 .02735 6402.28
(-.69) (-.84) (.11) (1.36)
(SUR) 458.15 -.0709 .0857 1492.62
(.47) (-.64) (.41) (.43)
82 (OLS) 31289.7 -.1923 -.1923 -45851.5
(3.33) (-2,08) (-.89) (-2.49)
(SUR) 32526.3 -.1552 -.2279 -48702.8
(4.34) (-2.16) (-1.54) (-3.30)
83 (OLS) 74.85 .0337 -.0437 2564.61
(.02) (.25) (-.18) (.36)
(SUR) -868.84 -.0175 .0300 4567.64
(-.27) (-.14) (.13) (.64)
84 (OLS) 63.67 .0333 1.0624 -236.61
(.08) (1.99) (6.79) (-.12)
(SUR) -455.37 .0010 1.1525 1283.03
(-.1.01) (.08) (11.68) (1.21)
88 (OLS) -1018.19 .0014 1.0862 3144.15
(-:i.7l) (.08) (6.03) (1.70)
(SUR) -1349.27 .0139 1.2096 3945.89
(-2.58) (.81) (7.32) (2.43)
R
.9399
.3239
.8704
.9509
.3750
.2871
.5156
.1083
.5402
.0218
.8498
.7223
D.W.
1.27
1.54
1.30
1.33
2.46
1.45
1.32
2.13
2.46
2.06
2.78
2.21
-70-
Table 12b (Cont.)
Co. No. Constant
Income
Measure
Lagged
Dividend
Capacity
Ratio
90 (OLS)
(SUR)
75.32
(.61)
119.86
(1.06)
.0325
(.80)
.0219
(.59)
.8395
(4.91)
.8579
(5.45)
-.6913
(-.46)
-125.16
(-.90)
D.W.
.9069 2.61
See Appendix A for company names.
Durbin-Watson statistic.
"All values in parentheses are t-values.
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Table 12c
OLS and SUR Shareholder Dividend Behavior (Group iii)
Q Income Lagged Capacity
Co. No. Constant Measure Dividend Ratio
02 (OLS) 1110.51 .0163 .9685 -791.91
(.26) C (2.05) (8.68) (-.07)
(SUR) 1816.47 .0152 .9688 -3419.37
(.89) (3.39) (16.56) (-.62)
07 (OLS) 41.05 -.0020 .8520 33.44
(.18) (-.50) (6.22) (.04)
(SUR) 38.91 -.0000 .8757 -14.33
(.38) (-.04) (13.21) (-.04)
08 (OLS) 3964.90 .0497 .1749 -7583.25
(5.52) (4.43) (.90) (-4.72)
(SUR) 4078.34 .0467 .1764 -7889.82
(9.72) (6.67) (1.94) (-7.87)
16 (OLS) , -257.46 .0422 1.0469 808.93
(-.33) (1.47) (6.02) (.35)
(SUR) -33.98 .0385 .9981 206.38
(-.12) (2.56) (13.07) (.23)
18 (OLS) -296.88 .1672 -.6478 3346.22
(-.18) (1.15) (-1.30) (.69)
(SUR) -1774.85 .2515 -.9207 7697.45
(-1.95) (3.41) (-4.18) (3.08)
19 (OLS) 84.93 .0002 .7609 23.63
(1.20) (.13) (6.04) (.26)
(SUR) 112.05 .0006 .7021 12.08
(1.81) (.36) (6.20) (.15)
24 (OLS) -2198.07 -.0328 .2652 3400.73
(-.96) (-.61) (1.11) (1.03)
(SUR) -1533.44 -.0283 .2170 2503.64
(.94) (-.80) (1.93) (1.11)
27 (OLS) -654.50 ,0384 -.0621 2098.66
(-2.70) (.54) (-.30) (3.50)
(SUR) -714.74 .0249 -.1393 2298.00
(-5.72) (.91) (-1.92) (9.17)
39 (OLS) 68.61 -.0014 .7738 -136.09
(2.49) (-.33) (5.74) (-1.70)
(SUR) 66.48 .0010 .7658 129.99
(5.11) (.46) (10.80) (-3.85)
40 (OLS) 3701.98 .0517 .5889 -7877.61
(3.66) (6.11) (3.51) (-3.70)
(SUR) 4030.29 .0510 .5779 -8735.70
(8.34) (9.84) (7.09) (-8.14)
41 (OLS) 229.90 -.1379 1.5985 -582.11
(.14) (-5.45) (9.11) (-.16)
(SUR) 302.32 -.1298 1.5258 -569.21
(.34) (-8.02) (12.63) (-.30)
42 (OLS) -590.95 -.1965 -.1572 2172.28
(-1.16) (-1.23) (-.71) (1.50)
(SUR) -422.74 -.2070 -.1286 1682.40
(-2.01) (-2.74) (-1.53) (2.82)
R
.9335
.7607
.7040
.7783
.1302
.7081
.1481
.5561
.6947
.8404
.8859
.2646
D.W.'
2.34
1.14
1.45
2.12
1.62
2.12
1.91
2.20
2.20
2.08
3.03
1.84
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Table 12c (Cont.)
Income Lagged Capacity
Co. No. Constant Measure Dividend Ratio
60 (OLS) 15453.7 .0404 .1029 -37204.1
(1.77) (.16) (.37) (-1.59)
(SUR) 13951.5 -.0741 .0348 -31024.6
(3.30) (-.55) (.26) (-2.80)
74 (OLS) 247.11 -.0213 -.0908 -455.52
(1.08) (-.30) (-.36) (-.65)
(SUR) 231.37 .0392 .0119 -454.15
(2.05) (-.13) (.08) (-1.39)
76 (OLS) -46,56 .0006 1.0692 135.74
(-.94) (.18) (17.73) (1.08)
(SUR) -26.73 .0005 1.0477 91.63
(-1.22) (.37) (28.24) (1.72)
79 (OLS) -30.56 .0017 1.1330 68.52
(-.68) (.54) (20.93) (.60)
(SUR) -32.50 .0044 1.1558 53.55
(-1.37) (2.52) (29.47) (.89)
1856
,0365
.9613
,9680
D.W.
1.52
2.02
1.62
2.26
See Appendix A for company names.
Durbin-Watson statistic.
All values in parentheses are t-values.
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TABLE 13
Time Aggregated Shareholders' Dividend Behavior
Income
Measure Constant
Income
Measure
Lagged
Dividend
Capacity
Ratio
R
A 32884.7
(3.42)
c
-.0045
(-.18)
-.2850
(-1.04)
-71860.3
(-3.16)
.3730
B 31454.1
(3.34)
-.0245
(-.89)
-.2537
(-.95)
-67937.9
(-3.03)
.4020
C 32868.7
(3.42)
-.0042
(-.17)
-.2846
(-1.04)
-71826.6
(-3.16)
.3729
D 31477.7
(3.34)
-.0239
(-.88)
-.2531
(-.94)
-67987.3
(-3.03)
.4009
D.W.
1.65
1.66
1.65
1.66
a
Income measures are defined in text.
Durbin-Watson statistic.
values in parentheses are t-values.
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TABLE 14
Shareholder Dividend Growth Rates
Continuous Compounded Growth Rate Growth Rate
Percentage Growth Rate With Moving Average Without Moving Average
At And Less # of % of # of % of
Least Than Insurers Total Insurers Total
9 14.8% 10 16.4%
6 12 19.7 11 18.0
6 12 22 36.1 26 42.6
12 18 8 13.1 9 14.8
18 24 4 6.6 1 1.6
24 30 2 3.3 2 3.3
30 36 3 4.9 2 3.3
36 42 1
61
1.6
61Total 100.
l
a
% 100.0%
T?otal exceeds 100 percent due to rounding.
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APPENDIX A
Co. No. Gompany List
01 INA (ii)
S
02 Rartford Accident & Indemnity (iii)
03 AETNA Casualty & Surety (ii)
04 Federal (ii)
05 American States (iii)
06 Royal Indemnity (iii)
07 Westchester Fire (ii)
08 Calvert Fire (ii)
09 Ohio Casualty (ii)
10 Providence Washington (ii)
11 Government Employees (i)
12 Feerlsss (ii)
13 Employers ?ire (iii)
14 Employers Casualty (i)
15 United Pacific (iii)
16 National Casualty (iii)
17 American General (i)
18 Reliance (ii)
19 American Credit Indemnity (iii)
20 Affiliated FM (iii)
21 Connecticut Indemnity (iii)
22 State Farm Fire & Casual ty (iii)
23 Californir Compensation & Fire (ii)
24 Hanover (i)
25 Utah Heme Fire (ii)
26 American Policyholders (iii)
27 Globe Indemnity Co. (iii)
28 Pacific (Earlier Guarantee) (iii)
29 Tri State (iii)
30 American Bankers (i)
31 Ci/il Service Employees (ii)
32 West American (iii)
33 Excelsior Insurance Company of New York (i)
34 Republic Indemnity (ii)
35 American Automobile (iii)
36 American Druggists Insurance Co. (i)
37 The American Insurance Co. (ii)
38 American Reinsurance (i)
39 Bituminous Casualty Corp. (ii)
40 Carolina Casualty (i)
41 The Cincinnati Insurance Co. (ii)
42 The Continental Insurance Co. (ii)
43 Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland (ii)
44 Fireraens Insurance Company of Washington D.C. (i)
45 Ger.eral Reinsurance Corp. (i)
46 Germantown Insurance Co. (i)
47 Hartor Insurance Co. (iii)
48 The Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Co. (i)
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APPENDIX A (con't.)
49 Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. (iii)
50 Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. (ii)
51 Northeastern Insurance Co. of Hartford (iii)
52 Pacific Employers (ii)
53 Phoenix Insurance Co. (ii)
54 Reinsurance Corporation of New York (ii)
55 Republic Insurance Co. (ii)
56 South Carolina Insurance Co. (i)
57 Trinity Universal Insurance Co. (ii)
58 United Fire & Casualty Co. (i)
59 United Fire Insurance Co. (ii)
60 United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. (i)
61 Western Casualty and Surety Co. (i)
Ownership arrangements are in the parentheses following the
company names. These (i), (ii), and (iii) ownership arrangements are
defined in the text.
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COMPANY LIST FOR COMMON STOCK PRICE
Year
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
Company No
a
11, 14 36, 02, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46,
12, 53, 10, 54, 55, 60, 62
30, 02, 37, 38, 40 . 42, 43, 05, 45, 46, 24,
12, 53, 10, 54, 55, • 60, 11, 14, 36
11
»
14. 37, 36, 33 43 05, 45, 46, 24, 48,
53, 10, • 54, 55, 57, 60, 42, 38, 40, 02, 30
52, 11 , 14, 39, 37. 36 40. 42, 43, 05, 30,
46, 24,
i
48, 51, 06, 12, 53, 10, 54, 55, 57,
71, 02, , 38, 40, 42, , 33 • 43, 45, 46, 24, 48,
12, 53 , 10, 54, 55. 57, , 60, 36, 52, 11, 14,
30, 02, 38, 40, 42, 33 • 43, 45, 46, 24, 48,
12, 53
,
10, 54, 55, , 56 > 57, 60, 61, 11, 14,
30, 02, 38, 40, 42 , 33 43, 45, 46, 24, 48,
06, 12, 53, 10, 54 55. , 56, 57, 60, 52, 11,
36
30, 02, , 38, 40, 42 , 33 , 43, 45, 46, 48, 51,
54, 55 , 56, 57, 60 , 52, 11, 14, 39, 37, 36,
30, 02, 38, 40, 41 42 33. 43, 45, 46, 48,
12, 10
.
54, 55, 56 , 57 60, 52, H, 14, 39,
53
30, 02 . 38, 40, 41 i 42 33 i 43, 05, 45, 46,
06, 12 , 10, 54, 55 , 56 , 57, 60, 11, 39, 14,
24, 15
30, 02 , 38, 40, 41 , 42 33 i 43, 05, 45, 46,
06, 12 , 10, 54, 55 , 56 . 57. 11, 14, 39, 36,
24, 15
30, 02 , 38, 41, 42. , 33 , 43 , 05, 45, 46, 48,
10, 54 , 55, 56, 57. 11
.
39
, 14, 36, 61, 60,
30, 02 38, 42, 33 i 43 , 05 , 45, 46, 47, 48,
10, 54
.
55, 56, 57. , 11
•
14
. 39, 36, 61, 60,
24, 48, 51,
48, 51, 06,
51, 06, 12,
02, 38, 45,
60
49, 51, 06,
39, 37
51, 06, 52,
39, 37, 36
49, 50, 51,
14, 39, 37,
06, 12, 10,
61, 53, 24
50, 51, 06,
36, 61, 24,
48, 50, 51,
36, 61, 53,
48, 50, 51,
61, 60, 53,
50, 51, 06,
12, 24, 15
50, 51, 06,
24, 12, 41
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Year Company No.'
1968 41, 30, 02, 38,
55, 56, 57, 47,
1969 30, 02, 38, 40,
61, 60, 36, 12,
1970 30, 02, 38, 40,
60, 36, 12, 24
1971 30, 02, 38, 40,
36, 61, 60, 12,
1972 30, 02, 38, 39,
14, 11, 36, 61,
1973 30, 02, 38, 40,
14, 11, 36, 61,
1974 30, 02, 38, 39,
14, 11, 61, 60,
1975
'
30, 02, 38, 40,
11, 14, 36, 61,
42, 33, 43, 05, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 06,
11, 14, 39, 36, 61, 60, 12, 24
33, 45, 46, 48, 51, 06, 56, 11, 14, 39,
24
33, 45, 46, 48, 51, 56, 14, 39, 11, 61,
33, 45, 46, 48, 51, 56, 58, 14, 39, 11,
24
40, 33, 05, 45, 46, 48, 51, 56, 58, 07,
60, 12, 24
33, 05, 45, 46, 48, 51, 56, 58, 07, 12,
60, 24
40, 33, 05, 45, 46, 48, 51, 56, 58, 07,
36, 12, 24
33, 05, 45, 46, 48, 51, 56, 57, 58, 07,
60, 24, 12
See Appendix A for company name.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR EQUATION (6) WITH DUMMY VARIABLE
INCOME MEASUREMENT (A)
o
-2 b
Co. No. a
l
a
2
a
3
R S.E.
(01) -1839.4 1.0601 -.073 .8736 26767
(-.22) C (8.77) (-.68)
(02) 1493 -.0078 1.0307 .9862 2148
(2.40) (-.23) (13.83)
(03) -4556.3 .4351 .3358 .5376 19242
(-.79) (2.60) (1.79)
(04) 325.22 .2704 .6249 .8542 5197
(.22) (2.64) (4.20)
(05) 111.19 .0058 .6997 .9275 105
(2.10) (.73) (5.06)
(06) 132.72 -.0782 1.125 .9399 549
(.71) (-.95) (7.59)
(07) -225.29 .267 .6457 .9023 911
(-.77) (3.67) (4.98)
(08) 2582.5 -.2371 .3963 .5045 2776
(1.71) (-.54) (1.85)
(09) 528.72 .0868 .8209 .8875 1365
(1.43) (1.01) (4.40) .
(10) 212.45 .1062 .4016 .9194 145
(3.38) (3.49) (3.27)
(11) 292.58 .1111 .8573 .9947 631
(1.62) (18.18) (44.53)
(12) 24.917 .0095 .9922 .8479 292
(.24) (.20) (6.20)
(13) -7.2276 .1526 .8707 .9496 291
(-.09) (3.60) (11.05)
(14) 111.33 .1952 .7338 .9922 254
(1.40) (4.54) (9.56)
(15) 371.94 .0147 .3226 .1364 1488
(.88) (.08) (.63)
(16) 60.653 .0117 .8618 .9756 65
(2.10) (.73) (11.73)
(17) 1357 -.0008 1.0343 .9864 1903
(2.70) (-.03) (20.14)
(18) 2234.1 .3953 .3538 .5608 10614
(.75) (2.33) (1.78)
(19) 374.64 -.0131 .2851 .3194 699
(1.54) (-.10) (1.34)
(20) 331.54 .0313 .6026 .9173 244
(3.80) (.90) (5.13)
(21) 128.33 .1718 .3704 .4957 398
(1.07) (1.31) (1.81)
(22) 274.33 .0385 -.017 .8918 290
(3.06) (5.57) (-.09)
(23) 12.64 .2372 .7992 .9393 176
(.22) (3.94) (10.45)
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u a
o. No. a
l
a
2
a
3
V S.E.
(24) 326.01 .0278 .8449 .9621 404
(1.98) (1.23) (10.07)
(25) 19.689 .0146 .8812 .9752 21
(2.33) (1.32) (14.90)
(26) 89.842 .0909 .6604 .8972 140
(1.46) (1.32) (3.57)
(27) 74.755 .2793 .7361 .8829 1179
(.21) (2.04) (3.30)
(28) -109.12 .1853 1.482 .6701 2926
(-.15) (1.92) (5.75)
(29) 93.23 .2619 -.1628 .217 241
(1.30) (1.11) (-.71)
(30) 11.651 .0558 .8283 .9936 40
(1.10) (2.31) (6.44)
(31) 41.569 .1596 .4287 .884 135
(1.10) (4.11) (3.01)
(32) -3.1029 .0376 .8305 .9625 90
(-.13) (2.76) (5.89)
(33) 7.9938 .0783 .9128 .9839 20
(1.32) (4.50) (19.71)
(34) 47.949 .1063 .8717 .9672 188
(.96) (.79) (3.52)
(35) -187.75 .6888 .2485 .4692 5857
(-.12) (3.08) (1.13)
(36) 5.5616 .0165 .9739 .9919 15
(.95) (1.60) (27.62)
(37) -135.71 .6539 .3963 .7731 7377
(-.06) (4.54) (2.19)
(38) 297.17 .0412 .9106 .9604 752
(1.33) (1,90) (15.84)
(39) 591.29 .0159 .2036 .3541 1083
(1.85) (.83) (.84)
(40) 1.9985 .9768 .8304 49
(.14) (-.81) (8.16)
(41) -46.752 .3465 -.049 .911 272
(-.65) (3.71) (-.14)
(42) -27871 1.1671 .0021 .4197 117009
(-.71) (3.08) (.01)
(43) -4089.9 1.5777 .0491 .8856 2475
(-4.90) (9.88) (.53)
(44) 3.7381 .0372 .9273 .9946 4
(1.83) (3.14) (19.09)
(45) -23.237 .0052 1.0084 .9976 82
(-.57) (1.79) (27.33)
(46) 7.011 .0776 .8282 .9951 11
(1.64) (2.68) (10.86)
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Co. No. a
l
a
2
a
3
R
2
S.E.
b
(47) -8.672 .1706 .3267 .2929 228
(-.14) (2.44) (1.58)
(48) 38.052 -.0018 1.0735 .9963 124
(.98) (-.14) (36.46)
(49) 6.827 .0246 .9686 .9966 17
(1.27) (5.01) (38.08)
(50) 36.173 .0307 .7849 .7647 144
(.93) (.96) (6.31)
(51) -1.3097 .0196 1.0458 .9931 24
(-.18) (2.49) (26.57)
(52) -115.15 .5027 .3928 .9007 1181
(-.34) (3.80) (2.24)
(53) 1758.9 .4158 .1273 .2643 13162
, (.51) (1.62) (.53)
(54) 1115.7 .1221 -.01 .1948 2557
(1.58) (.70) (-.04)
(55) 92.415 .1303 .8102 .9827 264
(1.22) (6.60) (13.32)
(56) -41.968 .0424 1.1938 .9666 72
(-2.03) (1.17) (15.07)
(57) 160.13 .0132 .721 .8891 235
(1.07) (.53) (3.11)
(58) -.0986 .0782 .9011 .9389 40
(-.01) (2.42) (6.35)
(59) 14.712 .0217 .9457 .9583 59
(.81) (.63) (7.03)
(60) 1331.2 .031 1.0304 .9912 2570
(1.80) (.72) (18.46)
(61) -105.81 -.0032 1.1854 .9954 124
(-2.31) (-.20) (21.76)
See Appendix A for company names.
Standard error of the estimate.
All values in parentheses are t-values.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR EQUATION (6) WITH DUMMY VARIABLE
INCOME MEASUREMENT (B)
a -2 b
Co. No. a
l
a
2
a
3
R S.E.
(01) 34403 -.1748 .3482 .4039 58138
(1.98) c (-1.46) (1.69)
(02) 1425.8 .0055 1.0122 .9865 2120
(2.30) (.73) (29.90)
(03) -3398.5 .1993 .8528 .5938 18035
(-.67) (3.19) (4.81)
(04) 1058.7 .0223 .3966 .8007 6076
(.60) (.52) (7.21)
(05) 115.66 .0026 .6974 .927 106
(2.11) (.65) (4.88)
(06) 144.65 .0135 .9969 .9407 546
(.79) (1.07) (11.77)
(07) -42.873 .058 .9615 .8629 1080
(-.13) (2.11) (8.41)
(08) 1744 .0427 .3517 .4989 2792
(1.81) (.30) (1.78)
(09) 527.95 .0119 .9504 .8817 1340
(1.39) (.29) (6.46)
(10) 199.57 .0109 .6002 .8719 183
(2.33) (.99) (3.88)
(11) 147.19 .1162 .8921 .9687 1542
(.32) (6.36) (19.09)
(12) 9.3542 .0684 .9744 .87 270
(.10) (1.76) (7.25)
(13) -22.481 .0471 1.0568 .9294 345
(-.23) (2.03) (14.09)
(14) 80.6088 .0892 .905 .9866 332
(.78) (2.13) (11.21)
(15) 150.76 .4306 -.2662 .3099 1330
(.39) (2.13) (-.57)
(16) 63.187 .002 .8833 .9751 65
(2.19) (.41) (13.22)
(17) 1348.8 -.0045 1.0385 .9865 1895
(2.69) (-.39) (30.83)
(18) 4412.5 -.0884 .5854 .4605 11763
(1.34) (-1.03) (2.92)
(19) 381.35 -.0226 .2993 .3278 695
(1.98) (-.49) (1.42)
(20) 326.46 .0117 .6381 .9143 248
(3.69) (.38) (5.42)
(21) 76.539 .2019 .4972 .5518 376
(.65) (2.04) (2.77)
(22) 140.09 .0221 .4922 .8607 329
(1.48) (4.49) (3.65)
(23) 20.21 .1961 .83 .929 190
(.32) (3.26) (10.24)
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Co. No. a
l ,*2
a
3
R
2
S.E.'
(24) 291.66 .0177 .8872 .9637 396
(1.82) (1.53) (11.93)
(25) 21.199 .0023 .8862 .973 22
(2.42) (.41) (14.38)
(26) 84.075 .0066 .8125 .8873 147
(1.30) (.09) (4.62)
(27) -133.3 .0548 1.0998 .9196 977
(-.44) (3.78) (10.96)
(28) -132.94 -.1519 1.559 .8721 1821
(-.29) (-6.16) (10.92)
(29) 138.67 -.0695 -.098 .1745 248
(1.92) (-.48) (-.42)
(30) 18.78 -.0103 1.1541 .9945 37
(1.91) (-3.06) (48.86)
(31) 39.224 .0736 .6854 .7982 178
(.78) (1.43) (3.84)
(32) 7.5126 -.0322 1.5055 .97 80
(.37) (-3.74) (15.15)
(33) 7.1619 .0212 1.0043 .9691 27
(.85) (1.38) (17.88)
(34) 65.014 -.0603 1.161 .9666 189
(1.31) (-.58) (6.57)
(35) 581.12 .2537 .3567 .2438 6991
(.31) (1.13) (1.35)
(36) 5.7733 .0051 .9843 .991 15
(.94) (.68) (26.98)
(37) 1244.1 .0001 .8157 .5136 10801
(.40) (.00) (3.42)
(38) 415.88 -.0039 .9414 .9526 822
(1.71) (-.32) (15.61)
(39) 588.41 .0238 .1-767 .3747 1065
(1.88) (1.14) (.74)
(40) 1.9987 . 97 68 .8304 49
(.14) (-.81) (8.16)
(41) -14.607- .1409 .83:79 .9629 176
(-.33) (7.63) (10.47)
(42) 59188 -.2472 .1178 .1486 141731
(1.48) (-.86) (.51)
(43) 1750.6 -.0787 .4124 .2797 6210
(.95) (-.59) (1.86)
(44) .0295 -.0025 1.0487 .992 5
(.01) (-.86) (31.13)
(45) -64.612 -.0015 1.0749 .9978 79
(-1.94) (-2.21) (54.00)
(46) 4.4602 -.0024 1.0273 .9934 13
(.92) (-.81) (34.43)
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Co. No. a
l
a
2
a
3
R
2 S.E.
b
(47) 35.818 .0265 .1877 .0662
262
(.52) (.39) (.82)
(48) 58.206 -.0073 1.0781 .9973 105
(1.76) (-2.66) (66.03)
(49) 1.121 .0028 1.052 .9924 25
(.14) (1.18) (38.07)
(50) 43.978 -.0009 8126 .7526 148
(1.11) (-.04) (6.29)
(51) -5.6525 .0022 1.1159 .9911 28
(-.69) (.84) (37.85)
(52) 43.975 .134 .8364 .8268 1560
(.09) (.77) (4.15)
(53) 4733.5 -.2661 .4485 .3418 12450
(1.41) (-2.24) (2.18)
(54) 1146.6 .0364 .0287 .1775 2584
(1.55) (.31) (.12)
(55) -43.222 .0253 1.0879 .9515
442
(-.35) (2.00) (16.06)
(56) -43.482 -.003 1.26 .9641
75
(-2.03) (-.22) (18.74)
(57) 154.55 .026 .7117 .9096
212
(1.26) (2.10) (4.17)
(58) -1.0411 .0607 .9496 .9316
42
(-.08) (1.83) (6.17)
(59) 15.138 .0226 .9627 .9585
59
(.87) (.69) (9.30)
(60) 1543.2 -.0012 1.0667 .991
2603
(2.16) (-.22) (40.08)
(61) -113.34 -.0068 1.2073 .9958
119
(-2.95) (-1.28) (36.58)
See Appendix A for company names.
Standard error of the estimate.
C
A11 values in parentheses are t-values.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR EQUATION (6) WITH
DUMMY VARIABLE INCOME MEASUREMENT (C)
Co. No.
a
a
l
a
2
a
3
R
2
S.E.
b
(01) -5766.4 1.0508 -.0515 .8682 27337
' \ (-.67) C (8.54) (-.48)
(02) 1508.5 -.0008 1.0172 .9861 2151
(2.44) (-.02) (13.32)
(03) -5466.8 .4095 .3401 .5236 19530
V :';•'
' (-.90) (2.46) (1.77)
(04) 202.76 .281 .5879 .8603 5086
•c (.14) (2.84) (3.89)
(05) 108.25 .0042 .7092 .9267 106
(2.05) (.59) (5.15)
(06) 133.14 -.0835 1.139 .9405 547
(.72) (-1.04) (7.54)
(07) -250.57 .2437 .6515 .8963 939
(-.82) (3.42) (4.82)
(08) 2590.8 -.2454 .4023 .5056 2773
(1.78) (-.58) (1.86)
(09) 458.83 .104 .777 .8882 1360
(1.22> (1.07) (3.63)
(10) 252.45 .0906 .3542 .9197 145
(4.03) (3.50) (2.77)
(11) 298.48 .1132 .8324 .9951 607
(1.72) (18.95) (44.51)
(12) 34.363 .0324 .9489 .8512 289
(.33) (.67) (5.70)
(13) -18.637 .16 .8538 .9503 289
(-.23) (3.66) (10.56)
(14) 97.393 .2014 .7132 .9923 252
.-
. (1.23) (4.60) (8.91)
r
(15) 337.88 .1896 -.0325 .1972 1435
f ' . (.83) (1.17) (-.06)
(16) 60.4 .0133 .8561 .9758 64
;i (2.11) : (.84) (11.50)
(17) 1356.4 -.0018 1.0357 .9864 1903
(2.70) (-.06) (19.68)
(18) 1840.4 .3807 .3484 .5616 10604
'
* (.61) (2.34) • (1.74)
(19) 366.94 -.0067 .2832 .3191 700
i -' (1.51) (-.05) (1.33)
(20) 277.84 .0805 .5854 .9336 218
A (3.45) (2.33) (6.31)
(21) 137.63 .1766 .366 .4935 399
(1.17) (1.28) (1.77)
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Co. No. a
l
a
2
a
3
*
2
(22) 257.07 .031 -.0359 .884
(2.80) (5.27) (-.18)
(23) 18.206 .216 .8067 .9353
(.30) (3.67) (10.26)
(24) 315.38 .0357 .8306 .964
(1.98) (1.58) (10.05)
(25) 20.506 .0179 .8667 .9761
(2.50) (1.58) (14.66)
(26) 102.52 .1491 .5266 .9106
(1.77) (2.17) (2.81)
(27) 83.202 .2502 .7239 .9155
(.27) (3.56) (4.79)
(28) -210.09 .42 1.7945 .6915
(-.29) (2.28) (5.39)
(29) 111.04 .1145 -.1501 .176
1 (1.53) (.52) (-.62)
(30) 4.9809 .0221 .9891 .9937
(.45) (2.42) (16.87)
(31) 35.171 .1587 .4273 .8818
(.92) (4.03) (2.95)
(32) -.2231 .0407 .7241 .9665
(-.01) (3.26) (4.77)
(33) 6.7551 .07333 .9038 .985
(1.16) (4.80) (19.93)
(34) 45.947 .1106 (.8637) .9674
(.92) (.88) (3.72)
(35) -382.13 .6463 .2747 .471
(-.24) (3.09) (1.26)
(36) 5.1125 .02 .969 .9925
(.91) (2.05) (28.35)
(37) -438.22 .6181 .4388 .7677
(-.20) (4.44) (2.45)
(38) 263.62 .041 .9037 .9608
(1.17) (1.97) (15.56)
(39) 534.93 .0364 .2412 .4996
(1.92) (2.48) (1.20)
(40) 2 .9768 .8304
(.14) (-.81) (8.16)
(41) -68.889 .3247 -.1717 .9235
(-1.01) (4.36) (-.51)
(42) -31578 1.1829 -.0112 .4147
(-.79) (3.04) (-.06)
(43) -4043.7 1.4703 .018 .8479
(-4.16) (8.30) (.16)
(44) 3.527 .0347 .9278 .9944
(1.70) (2.95) (18.23)
S.E.
300
181
394
21
131
1002
2829
248
40
137
85
19
187
5847
14
7464
748
953
49
252
117515
2853
4
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Co. No.
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
(57)
(58)
(59)
(60)
(61)
a
l
a
2
a
3
R
2
-18.209 .0051 1.0004 .9976
(-.42) (1.73) (23.90)
7.8501 .0842 .8178 .9958
CI. 96) (3.36) (12.59)
-16.019 .1943 .2432 .3496
(-.27) (2.84) (1.27)
41.137 -.0069 1.083^ .9964
(1.07) (-.57) (36.55)
7.4422 .0255 .9512 .9966
(1.38) (5.00) (33.91)
35.68 .0264 .787 .7618
(.90) (.84) (6.28)
-.6042 .0199 1.036 .9934
(-.08) (2.66) (25.67)
-115.61 .4857 .4064 .8971
(-.33) (3.65) (2.28)
1455.3 .4621 .0885 .2811
(.42) (1.76) (.36)
1082.3 .1467 -.0201 .2032
(1.53) (.83) (-.09)
15.927 .1492 .7569 .9811
(.21) (6.20) (10.66)
-35.153 .0416 1.1459 .9673
(-1.65) (1.35) (11.45)
156.91 .0155 .7132 .8896
(1.08) (.60) (3.10)
.091 .068 .8877 .9406
(.01) (2.56) (6.32)
12.693 .0383 .8609 .9598
(.74) (1.03) (5.17)
1036.3 .0523 1.0024 .9917
(1.32) (1.21) (17.13)
-100.16 .0007 1.1735 .9954
(-2.28) (.05) (21.11)
S.E.
82
11
219
123
17
145
24
1202
13012
2543
276
72
234
39
58
2508
124
See Appendix A for company names,
'standard error of the estimate.
:
A11 values in parentheses are t-values.
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APPENDIX C-4
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR EOUATION (6) WITH DUMMY VARIABLE
INCOME MEASUREMENT (D)
Co. No.
a
a
l
a
2
a
3
R"
2
S.E,
b
(01) 35133 -.1755 .3453 .4043 58118
(2.00) c (-1.46) (1.67)
(02) 1410.3 .0059 1.0116 .9866 2116
(2.27) (.78) (29.87)
(03) -3716.6 .1897 .835 .581 18316
(-.72) (3.05) (4.68)
(04) 1026.5 .0246 .894 .8013 6066
(.58) (.58) (7.19)
(05) 113.12 .0021 .7044 .9266 106
(2.09) (.57) (4.96)
(06) 144.4 .0134 .9961 .9406 546
(.79) (1.06) (11.73)
(07) -60.07 .0588 .9561 .8635 1077
(-.18) (2.13) (8.38)
(08) 1736.5 .0457 .351 .4989 2792
(1.78) (.31) (1.78)
(09) 523.22 .0091 .957 .8815 1401
(1.37) (.24) (6.65)
(10) 198.23 .0132 .6009 .8746 181
(2.38) (1.17) (3.99)
(11) 163.73 .1168 .8671 .9676 1569
(.36) (6.20) (18.15)
(12) 14.617 .0829 .9427 .8812 258
(.16) (2.26) (7.23)
(13) -24.93 .047 1.0542 .9291 345
(-.25) (2.00) (14.05)
(14) 74.039 .0866 .905 .9864 334
(.71) (2.06) (10.90)
(15) 192.47 .3375 -.2688 .3749 1266
(.53) (2.62) (-.64)
(16) 63.102 .0021 .8828 .9751 65
(2.19) (.44) (13.21)
(17) 1349.6 -.0047 1.0389 .9866 1894
(2.70) (-.41) (30.68)
(18) 4517.6 -.0884 .5884 .4592 11777
(1.36) (-1.01) (2.93)
(19) 381.48 -.0223 .2996 .3274 695
(1.98) (-.47) (1.42)
(20) 291.45 .0469 .6092 .9225 236
(3.33) (1.44) (6.04)
(21) 103.69 .1689 .4914 .5315 384
(.89) (1.79) (2.68)
(22) 143.1 .0187 .4344 .854 337
(1.48) (4.29) (2.94)
(23) 24.285 .1815 .834 .9265 193
(.38) (3.11) (10.13)
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Appendix C-4 (con't.)
Co. No. a
l
a
2 *3
P
2
S.E.
b
(24) 282.26 .0185 .8863 .9644 392
(1.78) (1.66) (12.03)
(25) 21.287 .0028 .8843 .9731 22
(2.45) (.49) (14.39)
(26) 83.37 .0392 .7593 .8894 145
(1.31) (.60) (4.27)
(27) -135.01 .0565 1.0874 .9295 915
(-.47) (4.34) (11.56)
(28) -132.55 -.1632 1.6082 .9171 1467
(-.36) (-8.26) (13.87)
(29) 143.67 -.0944 -.0799 .1874 246
(2.02) (-.72) (-.34)
(30) 20.895 -.0081 1.1526 .9934 41
(1.89) (-2.19) (42.40)
(31) 36.586 .0686 .6961 .7959 179
(.73) (1.35) (3.90)
(32) 4.9704 -.0348 1.5971 .9696 81
(.24) (-3.69) (13.01)
(33) 6.6269 .0244 .9963 .9704 27
(.80) (1.66) (17.86)
(34) 63.539 -.0411 1.13 .9664 190
(1.27) (-.43) (6.88)
(35) 454.75 .2611 .3596 .2531 6948
(.24) (1.24) (1.38)
(36) 5.4738 .0071 .983 .9912 15
(.90) (.96) (27.24)
(37) 1202.3 .009 .8111 .5137 10799
(.38) (.07) (3.42)
(38) 415.4 -.0032 .9419 .9526 823
(1.69) (-.27) (15.60)
(39) 495.57 .0439 .2465 .5505 903
(1.87) (2.98) (1.30)
(40) 2.0002 .9768 .8304 49
(.14) (-.81) (8.16)
(41) -25.002 .1375 .761 .9672 165
(-.59) (8.25) (9.40)
(42) 60589 -.2631 .1209 .1529 141374
(1.51) (-.91) (.53)
(43) ^1734.7 -.0741 .4179 .2786 6214
(.93) (-.57) (1.90)
(44) .0139 -.0024 1.0494 .992 5
(.01) (-.85) (31.25)
(45) -66.317 -.0015 1.0776 .9978 79
(-1.99) (-2.22) (53.33)
(46) 4.4141 -.0023 1.0268 .9934 13
(.91) (-.76) (34.40)
-90-
Appendix C-4 (con't.)
Co. No. a
l
*2 a3
R
2
S.E.
b
(47) 31.709 .0411 .1697 .0756 261
(.46) (.58) (.75)
(48) 57.84 -.0072 1.0791 .9974 104
(1.76) (-2.74) (66.39)
(49) 1.1918 .0027 1.0506 .9924 25
(.15) (1.14) (37.58)
(50) 44.442 -.0027 .8153 .7527 148
(1.12) (-.11) (6.31)
(51) -5.5981 .0023 1.1148 .9912 28
(-.69) (.88) (37.63)
(52) 41.472 .1337 .8351 .8265 1561
(.09) (.75) (4.05)
(53) 4866.1 -.2682 .4598 .3405 12462
(1.44) (-2.23) (2.21)
(54) 1125.5 .0447 .0283 .1797 2580
(1.52) (.38) (.12)
(55) -64.402 .0286 1.0826 .9515 442
(-.51) (1.99) (15.84)
(56) -43.493 -.0012 1.258 .964 75
(-2.00) (-.09) (16.88)
(57) 140.33 .0285 .7137 .9119 209
(1.16) (2.24) (4.25)
(58) -.7278 .0548 .932 .9338 41
(-.06) (2.02) (6.19)
(59) 13.963 .0372 .8987 .9599 58
(.84) (1.06) (6.98)
(60) 1540.6 -.001 1.0666 .991 2605
(2.15) (-.16) (39.95)
(61) -111.13 -.0063 1.206 .9957 120
(-2.89) (-1.18) (35.79)
a
See Appendix A for company names.
Standard error of the estimate.
C
A11 values in parentheses are t-values.








